Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fb07de096e9f2c21…

MALICIOUS

RTF

21.1 KB First seen: 2022-10-06
MD5: 0c5e9a51eae9e2189d1591e1200a84e3 SHA-1: ac66538351bdbfc1fd55290c50594071b63dba19 SHA-256: fb07de096e9f2c2114bbb1f8df5075a0a003e2bee7d6cb95f3f972728a4f5e10
260 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object with a CLSID associated with Equation Editor, and critical heuristics indicate exploitation of CVE-2017-11882. This vulnerability is commonly used to deliver malicious payloads. The presence of ` tf1 0 s24{\fonttbl{\f0 Arial;}}

Heuristics 6

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 likely critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    RTF decodes to an activated Microsoft Equation 3.0 OLE storage whose payload is a high-entropy Ole10Native stream rather than normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is a weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape consistent with CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802.
  • Ole10Native stream in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_OLE10NATIVE_STREAM
    RTF contains an embedded OLE object with an Ole10Native stream. This is a strong payload-container signal and is related to Word/OLE exploit delivery, but it is not specific enough on its own to assign a CVE.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001a36.bin
050608ea73043204c6964d405303e7f2d94ee7b58c2d1da87c85ff809ec1abd5
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1A36 4173 bytes