Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fafd7e8a5aafd368…

MALICIOUS

PDF

65.2 KB Created: 2020-05-15 23:04:58 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: e5d91de3e6bbdc292f507a196117c0e7 SHA-1: 4c27bc373a49ecfa8f6faaa50db5ebe919322ba9 SHA-256: fafd7e8a5aafd36871dce4fb0928da2b79fcac15d61d3d042c2c8ba1e1827b75
96 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains a large number of external links, many of which are numerically or generically named, suggesting a link farm or SEO poisoning tactic. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains references to 'Azshara raid guide' and the authoring application 'wkhtmltopdf', indicating a lure to potentially malicious content hosted on external domains. The ML classifier strongly flagged this PDF as malicious.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9985

Heuristics 4

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://givinghomes.org/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874394/130874394.html#azshara+raid+guide
    • http://plasticsintallahassee.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606282/4580895.pdf
    • http://boroscompany.com/uploads/1/3/0/5/130589230/307637.pdf
    • http://bigblackcooks.com/uploads/1/3/0/4/130490774/4766a3f63d.pdf
    • http://hurricaneharmonizers.com/uploads/1/3/0/2/130273762/xesajeruwaximenafev.pdf
    • http://ncjoyofgarlic.com/uploads/1/3/0/4/130483110/domonadusoro.pdf
    • http://kangenwaterdaily.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738921/4940533.pdf
    • http://armcandybytinkatl.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130620813/telofusisidatetetoj.pdf
    • http://theverybritishtshirtcompany.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130620689/xevimezujaf.pdf
    • http://nursehootdesigns.com/uploads/1/3/0/3/130313643/zoradagutodurovu.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d647.bin
42b14ee7f3004fdfc3c4c9fab229c0fb12efa92c704ef5ee6e848e08890ab7d3		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD647 10420 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.