Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 faf250a4952bf322…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

76.7 KB Created: 2021-03-17 05:37:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: eaa383afb7f24d36abe468feb8f90de4 SHA-1: 2377b9f6928293484c3e074f089f85e005cf7344 SHA-256: faf250a4952bf3228b111848914c57f11e16605479f9e9cc440aa096b0b291b8
260 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The sample is an OOXML document containing a VBA macro. The presence of an AutoOpen macro and critical heuristics for Shell() and WScript.Shell usage indicate that the macro is designed to execute arbitrary commands. This is a common technique for downloading and executing further malicious payloads.

Heuristics 7

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7ca507e5a0163a9951a6c28c5a9080950d55917bcebb4f4289f16cac8aa1bcd0		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 3011 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
c97fd33013d3cad30f1fffa089090fee8d97698de6126bc83ca060e9a0393d15		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 30208 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved artifact contains 4 long base64-like blob(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.

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