Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fac33ca4f6658b0e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

72.6 KB Created: 2021-06-25 09:00:36 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-11
MD5: 4e4ae0524901d1993f407455e0fbc803 SHA-1: 6a5f3c7fd75e110bba6e2089cb6c69fadc3cde85 SHA-256: fac33ca4f6658b0eaeb44e1f877e9ca6b4286174666386abf9c49554702461c1
276 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF document employs social engineering tactics, specifically a 'ClickFix' lure, to prompt users to execute commands. The document body contains instructions and references to opening command prompts, aligning with techniques like T1059.003 (Windows Command Shell). The embedded URLs likely serve as lures or potential download locations for secondary payloads, contributing to the overall malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • ClickFix social engineering attack high SE_CLICKFIX
    Document instructs the user to press Win+R or paste a command into a terminal — consistent with ClickFix attacks that bypass macro restrictions by tricking users into running malicious commands directly
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://smidgel.ru/uplcv?utm_term=how+to+open+cmd+in+windows+10+lock+screen PDF link annotation
    • http://lawcab.ru/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607fb79ded6df---85253687558.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bringem.de/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/eb08d88685f546aeb399e399911ab2d8/45160462000.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ne-moloko.ee/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/1c99c9246d88816d8bd3b47323001f69/pabazejukozexo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://orhs89reunion.com/clients/77823/File/lazivekewifu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://roweryelectra.eu/app/webroot/uploads/file/16213652564884.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://callhfelectric.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16087da9b1fd23---selajudelanameto.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gradeagroup.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/v64d185t5k3rtmjjmcdtnriq01/91687169778.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.fifatravels.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16075813deedc1---fusuvamijam.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dewalt-naradi.cz/media/upload/editor/file/34336476924.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.andeanskyline.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608fa515388a8---23442207938.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://cageart.ca/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16072055eddea7---tazewuvarapepuwo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.benvenutialmare.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a8432e1bf61---nemawoduvukubo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://am-assets.com/aom/magnolia/userfiles/file/fidobakete.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://gruppocinofilomarsalese.com/userfiles/files/44165476564.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lawcab.ru/wp-content/plIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000dd50.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDD50 5320 bytes
SHA-256: c1aac12c8a0c2ddf5b5eeff3cabb32ffcea3d329f23f4f18a5ff7ff61c504d24
font_01_sfnt_off0000ef69.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEF69 11156 bytes
SHA-256: 70ac20f1ecc4840bab5bd0a5bad0d5dfd4b16613afb8f31bad090d232339faeb

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