Formbook — Office (OLE) / .XLSX malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fab2d8011caa5944…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

162.0 KB First seen: 2022-06-29
MD5: 3dc878a41b07931eaa87b73069c1f235 SHA-1: d0f51a6051a6d44c92f561c2bd2012a1310eb6fa SHA-256: fab2d8011caa59449d97b3fafef9f01a815c7a81d38ff665af15b4c026e5c0c2
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Formbook · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.001 Malicious Link: User Execution T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell T1566 Phishing T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Link

The file is an encrypted Office document identified as a carrier for the CVE-2017-0199 exploit. This exploit is used to download a secondary payload from the URL https://golkeeper.github.io@arpix.ch/xGNAI. ClamAV detection confirms this is a Formbook downloader. The document's encrypted nature and exploit carrier structure are key indicators of malicious intent.

Heuristics 7

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Encrypted Office package with CFB FAT corruption critical OLE_ENCRYPTED_AND_MALFORMED
    Encrypted-package shape co-occurs with FAT-chain corruption — the documented combined evasion form.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Formbook-bc97c1e0c33c3c93-9951465-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Formbook-bc97c1e0c33c3c93-9951465-0
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE
    OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007, AES)).
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://golkeeper.github.io@arpix.ch/xGNAI