Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fa854ad5586adb17…

MALICIOUS

PDF

83.0 KB Created: 2020-12-20 12:40:26 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-27
MD5: 61554ffad0908e65e7524d1c97afa108 SHA-1: d7529aba2d29545441fb66d073b1bf051c9cb16a SHA-256: fa854ad5586adb172d5727bc85785d34ec5e9435325695ed43906a2d488d2286
364 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF document contains numerous links to external sites, many of which are hosted on disposable domains, indicating a link farm designed to host phishing lures. One critical heuristic specifically flags this as a brand-impersonation credential phishing attempt, directing users to an abused redirector. The presence of a malicious redirector URL and the nature of the heuristics strongly suggest a phishing attack.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Recovery secret / private key request critical SE_SECRET_RECOVERY_LURE
    Document requests recovery phrases, private keys, backup codes, or saved passwords. Requests for these secrets in a document are high-risk.
  • Brand-impersonation credential phishing lure critical SE_BRAND_CREDENTIAL_PHISH
    Document impersonates a well-known consumer brand and uses account-security / verification language ('unusual activity', 'account on hold', 'verify your account') to steer the reader to a credential-harvesting link. Corroborated by: action link to abused redirector https://bonujuvab.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132740321/jumefaxiruxefof_wawowinat.pdf.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gettraff.ru/strik?utm_term=android+studio+release+apk+is+not+signed In PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4446923/normal_5f9f871fe81e0.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bonujuvab.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132740321/jumefaxiruxefof_wawowinat.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://liletalezawo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134591830/zetudupepu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4382773/normal_5fd15639c70ff.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://venifamu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134501621/vaminanoz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bigonokefexix.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134518339/bakirivusedifirade.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xobopigo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437845/tepamenos_nujamiwiju_jovimu_jinarer.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4375541/normal_5f8c2a67b15a1.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/f886db44-f64e-47cb-b33d-b69adc530b3b/30761018299.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/27944dc7-8dcb-4db2-b681-9ef26fc4c14b/bepobo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/17b51c70-e413-45de-9558-b0cd2c19fa54/51595462875.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5fc506a3c30a162e0c6cfff4/t/5fcab60c980ea222adc74181/1607120398172/break_time_in_mexico.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/1c799502-5b57-470a-9338-48d4e4a8f486/aetna_breast_pump_in_network.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/92dc6c3d-932a-4ebf-9695-a7e75923aef0/xefiditibutoz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00010754.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10754 5180 bytes
SHA-256: f46fc7ccf8bd79b07649eae5dd4aba2e9b2f2d6016414e22eccf29403eaa037d
font_01_sfnt_off00011907.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11907 11084 bytes
SHA-256: 14209dea4d4e805de686c37a27c2b8a74318798bb67e04ea8a6ab52a6acc412f