Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fa0fa3ed24811e4b…

MALICIOUS

PDF

70.3 KB Created: 2021-03-18 04:15:38 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: d8a5b87f6bd46dd63b51b08b194b249f SHA-1: eb91afb6897cd94149e3ec975c15443209b8c0a1 SHA-256: fa0fa3ed24811e4bd2943912aab3e63b65b0a60970aafcaa6ace2c8df585c0ea
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file was detected as malicious by ClamAV and an ML classifier, indicating a high likelihood of malicious intent. It functions as a link farm, containing numerous external URLs pointing to other PDF files, many hosted on disposable domains. The presence of external URIs and the overall structure suggest it's designed to redirect users to potentially harmful content or engage in SEO manipulation.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9996

Heuristics 6

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://pelibifir.ru/123?utm_term=sh+cumar+faaruuq+tafsiir+free
    • https://rarejitidod.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/9/135993923/1957153.pdf
    • https://wotigutaz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134361511/petajerabanoso_fizizegapi.pdf
    • http://momentikshop.space/disney_premier_access8nl99.pdf
    • https://tarezusubem.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135386237/973439641116b57.pdf
    • https://tiletemilowa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132710791/1962293.pdf
    • https://sewigemebovoneb.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/3/9/133997870/vefuwubad_jididanigokivu_posilusotisapad.pdf
    • http://maturibcgj.space/76656060997rwp6i.pdf
    • https://nalafefig.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379301/a0aa5b57863d3.pdf
    • https://patewowuxafopon.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134595548/9588532.pdf
    • https://jematujevuzonip.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/2/134235480/619ad8.pdf
    • https://satizivuzaked.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134383512/7855693.pdf
    • https://maraduwiz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134363873/c3bb3cfede0ab1.pdf
    • https://pirowefe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134444143/7152618.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/mujevubutukoxu/job_interview_questions_and_answers_2019.pdf
    • http://metusajixano.epizy.com/94450660749.pdf
    • http://woxenebifa.rf.gd/bolodiwekiguror.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/sinamozagemoger/how_to_make_your_own_cigar_humidor.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/sonutopexaramuf/vexizoxul.pdf
    • http://katasekut.epizy.com/sas_platform_administrator_interview_questions_and_answers.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/daxemo/kindle_e_publishing_format.pdf
    • http://gabozimipuz.epizy.com/36534623667.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d9e6.bin
3853cc381ac7a3a1af32e4c6bf8e4214428ce3318b5169517daa8872047d5119		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD9E6 5320 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000ebd8.bin
95dd736987f9df8471159be569bf4700aa8869f5465a72e66a140cfdc546e80c		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEBD8 9352 bytes

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