Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fa03c55eb995a130…

MALICIOUS

PDF

86.9 KB Created: 2021-09-20 09:33:56 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-16
MD5: 13d7c98df542c9943591ffc53c8cc18b SHA-1: f4c6861074fcd9d0fed10d02b43e495a926710a6 SHA-256: fa03c55eb995a1300128c036e33ea92ae9d3863b8492aa1a2f543b45551c6ca2
104 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains embedded JavaScript and numerous external URIs, many of which are hosted on disposable domains or compromised CMS upload directories. These links appear to form a link farm designed to redirect users to potentially malicious content, as indicated by the ML classifier and heuristics. The presence of embedded JavaScript suggests an attempt to execute malicious code within the PDF viewer.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9940

Heuristics 6

  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://catamma.ru/uplcv?utm_term=mulan+film+stream PDF link annotation
    • http://keemunblacktea.cn/uploads/file/040110262165.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dpsszczytno.pl/photo/file/66285351387.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://koala-al.com/d/files/8830249352.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://anpo.vn/upload/files/nesewogebose.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.siscard.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613cf995a0199---minulaw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://hzxf.com/images/upload/File/pogibofumurolif.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ooexperience.be/assets/Image/files/28176924878.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://staceyasp.com/UserFiles/file/sutenefitesalasa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://franciscovalles.comtraining.cl/userfiles/files/sevufutanipubojifivuju.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lighthouse-connection.at/myPix/file/faser.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://europeanprofservices.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161465b35cbbfa---38002860970.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.gamylai.vn/uploads/files/80911539741.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wuyioutdoor.com/userfiles/file/54062980325.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://srcchaika.ru/files/uploads/files/jagosexibirulatojoguvux.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://weighlessthisyear.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/20290675695.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://alenakovalchuk.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/b642d02bae905d1920b756dfe59ebdd0/43577000712.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zenithoverseas.com/assets/userfiles/files/24143950064.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://globalfeedindustry.com/upload/files/sipot.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://responsible-tourism-alliance.com/content_file/files/kefagil.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://przedszkolenisko.pl/userfiles/file/78401411361.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ceadersvalet.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613cd84bd0add---sunewow.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://treasurehunterdetectors.solar-ovens.net/ckfinder/userfiles/files/82475514117.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://traditionsradio.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/6aa013101b193d3f862e83330b67f77e/64259611953.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://navigator-nsk.ru/userfiles/file/52626753913.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lexus-custom.com/js/upload/files/barikakuminanofuze.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://agrobud.net/uploaded/file/6510903237.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ecaf.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xECAF 10348 bytes
SHA-256: c47fd25c8b3d4acd42c5810edcb5eafa5ff6a9b78d6f35eef992db0a479fda83
font_01_sfnt_off00010400.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10400 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_02_sfnt_off00011c12.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11C12 19088 bytes
SHA-256: 2117fb6097695e93c634606a3244175b16fe17d665681c214574e2ff9d16efea