Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f9f9590decd385c9…

MALICIOUS

RTF

92.2 KB First seen: 2024-07-06
MD5: b8647e9307cd02f868c77a042f2005a4 SHA-1: 4821b7bf6761b6d6b0d3509993163d257204a839 SHA-256: f9f9590decd385c9621b42ae433060e0757fa72240a13acbbef801edffcf51eb
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of \objupdate indicates that the OLE object is designed to be activated automatically, likely leading to the execution of a secondary payload. This is a common delivery mechanism for exploiting vulnerabilities to download and run malware.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001796.bin
d100ac71a4ffc02f284d0b0b56fa655255c24ba7f9805329cbb40a482d69ae9e
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1796 1853 bytes