RTF malware analysis — malicious · f9f5920a5e9235d1

MALICIOUS

RTF

15.4 KB First seen: 2023-02-22

MD5: b889ba28933af645637ca6036ad1ccc2 SHA-1: 8d06387e577ef13546aab1c4888c3d9109e7da64 SHA-256: f9f5920a5e9235d1ee4ed4a225f95654689cfd7fa34150672055a499ab13a25d

120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 Malicious Link

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of \objupdate indicates that the OLE object is designed to be activated automatically, likely leading to the execution of a malicious payload. The heuristics strongly suggest exploitation of the Equation Editor, a common vector for initial compromise.

Heuristics 3

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00001a4a.bin` `6e119ed2b85df973efaec4ebfae87c19b5bd5914089340eeebe0335a282e4c38`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1A4A	1987 bytes

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