Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f9c620fc7fa0f98d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

1.35 MB
MD5: 4846f876613c8d9a69e87d4b7eb078c9 SHA-1: fead2f5fa948f9c2c812e3600b6d31adb2f43ab8 SHA-256: f9c620fc7fa0f98d534882a70c81d6b3cf18269fe4e82784be0dcf9758d4d7e8
100 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1559.001 Component Object Model

The sample is an encrypted Office document that utilizes embedded OLE objects, with a high-confidence detection of the Equation Editor vulnerability. This suggests the document is designed to exploit CVE-2017-11882 to deliver a malicious payload. The encryption with a default password further indicates an attempt to hinder analysis.

Heuristics 3

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.