Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f98c43aed5d49f37…

MALICIOUS

PDF

95.2 KB Created: 2021-02-22 17:23:03 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-26
MD5: 20bf869f04942ecfceabbd1d121e2202 SHA-1: 50fcd0bc9258b52f780fe5b5254f19e8ce69c279 SHA-256: f98c43aed5d49f37392fb8460129c8b760c8e95e60b10126f646b4746089c8ee
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains a large number of external links, as indicated by the PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM and PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM heuristics. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent. While no scripts were directly extracted, the structure and numerous outbound links point towards a phishing or SEO spam campaign, potentially distributing further malware or leading to malicious websites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://seumenha.ru/strik?utm_term=how+do+you+define+heavy+rain+on+ps4 PDF link annotation
    • https://pebezudaxefen.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134347708/2f1e6c6.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/lunosupi/ccLuRgi/71463882544.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/tefaxobaf/jdJhfEY/space_shooting_game_ps4.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kelonefak.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132683111/zuwesuvudo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xelasukozulete.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681542/sebufu_mebabijajaweral_nafepuwek_bibal.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/busibelifiv/jbxgghb/zafag.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/notenirikev/e4LSjhK/pocket_bully_weight_at_12_weeks.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/noluxokeruma/jeNGJgj/1466312143.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/giganopof/agh5ggB/50710278768.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kejamezegujoz.iblogger.org/pinazidoraxexonal.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vuderuxedus.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134692959/zuzumubagik_vobezisov.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/kofabube/watermark_photoshop_template.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://jusejafek.rf.gd/40798988402.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/wisuw/78896830558.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/farefasejikap/46764123665.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/xufoxorog/65966756142.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sozanizitug.epizy.com/13688958565.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0001360f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1360F 5400 bytes
SHA-256: 2615afb26c812c4a6bbd98ab0d1feaa58b0486b36e6fcbe604ae6d8afa25fdf3
font_01_sfnt_off00014886.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x14886 11796 bytes
SHA-256: 3d99b9bcb6a1154b59964f535ae125cfc2a04323f98a9978e2dbc518241c8e50

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