Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f9830f5a61091acd…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

80.5 KB Created: 2021-04-30 07:24:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 53f9e168111cc69071eb3bc2a10cddbb SHA-1: 59070bc40f22f149576d1af952f759097832aa09 SHA-256: f9830f5a61091acdaac29a0c00b58811b7715b91bf3e5f35cd046b40a248fd8d
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The OOXML document contains VBA macros, specifically triggering a Document_Open macro. Critical heuristics indicate the use of Shell() and WScript.Shell, suggesting the macro attempts to execute arbitrary commands or download and run a second-stage payload. The presence of these indicators strongly points to a malicious document designed for initial execution.

Heuristics 7

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — context-specific rules above attribute URLs they actually evaluated; this rule lists URLs that were present in the bytes but were not otherwise tied to a specific finding.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
64567cc1102349906dcda791a369e73791f5a694fc93aa7ef9c9e2ff941311ae		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 6356 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
a7b5c710de3da233bff7a4aea8486442054dac9d301232f8dcc4491de674fd9b		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 30720 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.

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