Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f9600693c4eefed0…

MALICIOUS

RTF

257.5 KB First seen: 2020-05-25
MD5: 718bb6fb90ec7880ad5bdf3371a4ea3a SHA-1: b8c30a7cea283755475e3bd334b49b3639684d15 SHA-256: f9600693c4eefed0e41e8d59743a290f040da227ad96340dbf371fe7948a78ed
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains OLE object data that is automatically linked and updated, indicating an attempt to exploit OLE2Link vulnerabilities like CVE-2017-0199 or CVE-2017-8759. This mechanism is used to force the activation of an embedded OLE object, which likely downloads and executes a second-stage payload. The specific vulnerabilities exploited are identified by the high-severity heuristics.

Heuristics 4

  • CVE-2017-0199 / CVE-2017-8759 (OLE2Link auto-activated remote loader) critical CVE related RTF_OLE2LINK_REMOTE_MONIKER_LOADER
    RTF embeds an OLE2Link object that is force-activated with \objupdate (no user interaction on open) and fetches a remote second stage — through an INCLUDETEXT/INCLUDEPICTURE field or the OLE object's own moniker. This is the OLE2Link auto-update attack path shared by CVE-2017-0199 (server returns an HTA/scriptlet) and CVE-2017-8759 (server returns a SOAP WSDL the .NET parser compiles). Office processes the fetched response through the same code path; the specific CVE depends on the now-unreachable server content type.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000003f.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3F 2605 bytes
SHA-256: 1d00d7bc4cbbd5dc40f6cea2fdc07c7cc917468aac7460296018a322606f1aa7

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