Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f93d84e3b698be1a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

46.4 KB Created: 2020-10-31 09:55:57 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-04
MD5: b5a8373048a9363a000c26b6e9eb14c6 SHA-1: d587b2a9f39edeab05ee9af0b3ae2ddae3ade5cb SHA-256: f93d84e3b698be1ae5bda23c1d55c9326edfd311100ebf8f1ac1c8081077d96f
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF document was flagged as malicious by an ML classifier. The file embeds a large number of external links characteristic of an SEO link farm and routes users through malicious redirector infrastructure. Specific URLs and indicators for this sample are listed in the indicators section.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/strik?keyword=western+union+money+transfer+application+form In PDF document text
    • https://ralubimuxafoku.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134373731/4353727.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zijovegumasapal.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134307166/3fbce6a7856a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zalopajozi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453352/417485.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zulatikuwa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776211/dutotetiz_tazekimuz_neziseb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vilukenuxe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132814007/16c7aba32.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xutifivaluladar.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134337767/depegaletev_rarabaloso_wokadazup.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jimagofer.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813953/b157112afd08a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zinikedefi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740178/060bbe2c2d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pisanofinupu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437881/4933041.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dutitujazekap.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814390/logape.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://meboguvogo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437667/ribepodo_vajukesawe_wimipegiduwut_sivaxube.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jakedekokobara.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131381480/berif_jikobuzef.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nagigezivozitos.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134340852/d6787cc19.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0592/6809/files/82536469636.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0502/0742/4704/files/rotupugaviregafemuz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0427/8134/3903/files/votujunidegolufed.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000074c3.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x74C3 5276 bytes
SHA-256: e700f03db6dbd86ef3a8ca44f93da7568c8470ffef0d9767f506a9d86add3758
font_01_sfnt_off000086b4.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x86B4 10904 bytes
SHA-256: df4653bde357f52a7d8c2ce170ba01c3d9d0035ec18b95393c727bb1532c6c03

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