Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f93502bb85889b11…

MALICIOUS

RTF

81.0 KB First seen: 2024-08-22
MD5: 55f8f4d3e0a9c939c28da10340f86c3d SHA-1: 899cc66dd607bc326c59939c1e72842b40802c02 SHA-256: f93502bb85889b118e5c829a484f2ad262ea63ca6f481ed1b44a3dc271793b23
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document containing an OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, triggering critical heuristics for Equation Editor exploitation. The ".objupdate" directive forces OLE activation, indicating an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882) for arbitrary code execution. This is likely used to download and execute a secondary payload, a common technique for initial access.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001ef8.bin
2e4671348b49aed43c6b3e45f558b12742eda0cd0536618528c581c98b9636bd
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1EF8 1686 bytes