Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f8dc0f3d8744f9a8…

MALICIOUS

PDF

86.8 KB Created: 2021-01-16 17:56:24 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-27
MD5: 07dc5657062dcf10e6c8de7949ae5dd1 SHA-1: d730efe2bc6e2f9b2c382fa43377d31d09fbb4e1 SHA-256: f8dc0f3d8744f9a89563c9c4f04c0d5f6ff104ea309cbbd52125e45485927628
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains numerous external links, many pointing to disposable hosting services, indicating a link farm designed to redirect users. The presence of a critical heuristic firing for 'PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM' and a high ML score strongly suggest malicious intent. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and link farm behavior are indicative of a phishing or malware distribution lure, likely leveraging embedded JavaScript for redirection.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffset.ru/123?utm_term=la+prueba+del+cielo+pdf+bajar+gratis PDF link annotation
    • https://kavirozix.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/3/9/133999962/8162230.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://panikudar.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437701/c14226c1c0.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://puzalanenezow.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134693659/nisekik-zuzijabiro.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1175722.mozfiles.com/files/1175722/64222652915.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nafuxiba.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134097784/6ccc10cada17c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jimagofer.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813953/vinifiraso_xexewepoxi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pevinuwipe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130873962/f5f866b910c2.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xavoxoxuda.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379246/9979988.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/gezejoputiwinu/jointly_and_severally_liable.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/mijedusovineti/equivalent_weight_definition.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zesotat/aetna_insurance_provider_appeal_form.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00010a57.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10A57 3160 bytes
SHA-256: 2a8620b7123a9eaa263c6e9f74932bc99fa0d19117621328421def6172b571f2
font_01_sfnt_off00011599.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11599 5480 bytes
SHA-256: 114e768f94cf173983bdecd99a1c7e248270ecb7b240c787b91b2567759d9404
font_02_sfnt_off0001284d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1284D 11448 bytes
SHA-256: f2f29c87bcf2644edc9a0e64149ea0e64969683ab6ef5fab148bcbbff3fb98d4