Office (OLE) / .XLS malware analysis — malicious · f8d7042c244f4000

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.70 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel

MD5: f4dfa5ef9edf40b3067404ccfbd1f129 SHA-1: 86f1e61d494f2efd9944a145cc739f68b19ad01b SHA-256: f8d7042c244f4000d11f2b3e82b199f6f3b60b60915dca206365796aa9e6b815

134 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell

The critical heuristic firing for CVE-2017-0199 indicates that the OLE file uses a URL moniker to download and execute a remote loader from the URL 'https://e.vg/oJlGUYxPc?&оооооо'. Additionally, an embedded PDF was found to contain a suspicious URI pointing to 'https://www.eventmediaservice.ch/droits-politiques/'. The presence of these elements strongly suggests a malicious intent to download and run a secondary payload.

Heuristics 5

OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199

Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.

URL https://e.vg/oJlGUYxPc?&оооооо
Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE

A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdfx/1.3/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/g/img/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#
- http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/
VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS

Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
External URI info PDF_URI

PDF contains an external URL action

URL https://www.eventmediaservice.ch/droits-politiques/
PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE

PDF has 2 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdfx/1.3/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/g/img/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#
- http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`macros.bas` `7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673`	vba-macro	oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source)	1206 bytes
`polyglot_child_pdf_off00001400.pdf` `b25ad2a0460310ab5de124db2d81e2395c07bfab474fd77ea7e873c5c1ab9096`	polyglot-child-pdf	Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1400	1777664 bytes
`polyglot_child_pdf_off00037a00.pdf` `ef0c5ff464476767dea4f63c5ec1c0d3e6a675070f5d6b62ce7b6fd841cdaca2`	polyglot-child-pdf	Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x37A00	1554944 bytes

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