Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f8cc3dee8fbb7666…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

577.3 KB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: 773aa73383d59aa417f4a827eeb51edc SHA-1: 16fc4bef3ffd894e5e9807e8d461cd819caa2147 SHA-256: f8cc3dee8fbb7666b79507287783f238f4069853f5a1e484c1df8ed96206a67a
240 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is an RTF document that leverages the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-8759) to achieve code execution. The presence of OLE object data and the ".objupdate" directive strongly suggest an exploit is embedded. The heuristic 'SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE' indicates the document may be designed to trick the user into opening a password-protected archive, which is a common delivery mechanism for malware.

Heuristics 7

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0008b048.bin
aa0974b2ed3d25fffcf66feb4e038513cc538970b1deb21a4b1eecc5168ea289		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x8B048 3739 bytes

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