Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f8b1ab3db2ec4746…

MALICIOUS

RTF

92.9 KB First seen: 2022-11-08
MD5: 20a1197fc28aa67ed4a6fc68ddf0dec9 SHA-1: 826eeec6da9f3419d5da2de2198c57d97f584053 SHA-256: f8b1ab3db2ec47469e1ccb8e523b6e4ec4e0837b8a56f9b223d04c74210bc43f
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object that leverages a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor component. The presence of `RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR` and `RTF_OBJUPDATE` heuristics strongly indicates exploitation of this vulnerability for code execution. The embedded OLE object (`objdata_00_off00001d65.bin`) is the likely mechanism for delivering the exploit.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001d65.bin
b0980d3524b00761b8dffb84d2df5b04e0d288958811375621cbb1b36e074344
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1D65 2082 bytes