Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f89b0c8c9a825d6c…

MALICIOUS

PDF

69.3 KB Created: 2021-09-01 13:38:30 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-16
MD5: effa97ac4e32741db266968df0880927 SHA-1: 5b37a4ac7c620f83d3289fb4c28c507c32d842b7 SHA-256: f89b0c8c9a825d6c8ad230a1078b2b8f6c7e3a2b928245ee2888e49dfb60ffc1
224 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF document is designed as a phishing lure, presenting itself as an image to trick users into clicking a link. The embedded JavaScript and numerous external links, particularly to compromised WordPress uploads, suggest it is intended to download and execute a second-stage payload. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9995

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Image-only document with action trigger (screenshot lure) medium PDF_IMAGE_LURE
    PDF has 1 image(s), only 0 text block(s), carries a click-outward action, and is only 69 KB — typical shape of a phishing lure where a full-page screenshot hides a clickable button that launches or submits to an attacker URL.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://huntic.ru/uplcv?utm_term=convert+mbr+to+gpt+from+bios PDF link annotation
    • https://detectiveoffice.net/userfiles/file/jejozaxesutavawerod.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bhsbeacon.com/FCKeditor/file/xipasasixopelafotafoponi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://edu-family72.ru/content/images/uploads/file/81367529509.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mosoptagro.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/c661fd5e29368e8f5c7d5dd2c00d9a84/zakopipemaf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://congtrinhnhaviet.vn/upload/files/87405476977.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://parentini.it/userfiles/files/xasejadifadafamonibotiwat.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.funes.gob.ar/ckfinder/userfiles/files/844648147.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://doublehappyvstheinfinitesadness.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16094cdc33a659---38078882669.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://aneri12.eu/res/file/laxuzomoxodobef.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.xpresswedding.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160820f36ba3b3---12432258174.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://hatowo.com/app/webroot/uploads/files/penepusabepenu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sogelec-eng.com/files/ckfinder/files/53193577712.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://absolutelyneon.com/userfiles/file/wejunefawamarujufo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ivanamihic.com//files/rotofivaxabapekebofadowi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://schreinerheusi.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607bd18815b9d---xezidogasasitegelu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://forglass.sk/userfiles/file/fuvejijon.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.elitelawnsolutions.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/qmhk4p2kjbsrmudo1lnbe17938/26373150047.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.virtualaid.eu/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16075e34af1975---32635691047.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kaizousha.com/js/upload/files/60559002139.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bahamianbrewery.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/37838950605.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://harringtonandlombardi.com/customer/3/d/9/3d947ad6ce2568d98b832ccf5548371bFile/domozobumawimuzotugidip.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://orkhaconstruction.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/6qhadd00uabp4c0cns5n3vseb3/14863094272.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000b364.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xB364 10732 bytes
SHA-256: fa26f91dcbe97a2dd9c052ae9ef778175a8d73523565041ee93411265d1b9d72
font_01_sfnt_off0000cbe4.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCBE4 13828 bytes
SHA-256: d71a32731a39a01dc64fc6c75076c0cdf39e5fcb836a822ed40445453272b68a
font_02_sfnt_off0000edb4.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEDB4 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1