Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f89a5b71c4901ee1…

MALICIOUS

PDF

86.8 KB Created: 2021-06-26 04:00:16 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: eea317c74fd8d63854cf42d7f135e056 SHA-1: 4e971f744333663c73b5774d129ffae0c8acf0d8 SHA-256: f89a5b71c4901ee14244b7bb6046f9ff840e09082f79220996d0f7289fde430a
176 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF file was detected as malicious by ClamAV and an ML classifier, indicating a high likelihood of malicious intent. It contains numerous links to compromised WordPress upload directories, suggesting it's part of a link farm designed to redirect users to malicious content. The presence of a QR code lure further supports a phishing or malware distribution vector.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9848

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://dacoma.ro/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609ca1e17e546---kopowosokowo.pdf
    • https://www.varisistanbul.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607da3e69824b---ridagikobotiwujapedoli.pdf
    • https://www.lightingdynamics.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/3e512ec509e402139fec55e1218bd398/tuvafexefuxanojifatigonak.pdf
    • https://mission4recruitment.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a1510d13cf6---64667920559.pdf
    • https://skinrepublic.vn/webroot/img/files/xoxad.pdf
    • http://slp72.com/clients/7/7b/7b902bee17765b19ebdde6030f24742d/File/45986796620.pdf
    • https://smarttactic.ro/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ad64b9ca868---zawigu.pdf
    • http://blog.crowdly.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16079b86d4448b---mafifagawitojejaruzawewe.pdf
    • http://maxtarget.by/ckfinder/userfiles/files/84733850384.pdf
    • http://www.nisbd.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609f12ecef445---51237216961.pdf
    • https://yidinfo.net/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/871vuumlfa5dtceb8050ojki05/gifarutoxezametiwiverebof.pdf
    • https://lllk.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/f24e5b4d74bca484c1ea175736b3c75d/2352445842.pdf
    • https://www.marthatrotts.ca/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a28bc8c98fd---47258390361.pdf
    • https://yziact.fr/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/f8rcfn89bjg8dlrempm6qr345f/zuribidokag.pdf
    • https://obermeyer-modemarkt.de/upload/file/ravebofib.pdf
    • https://sumangold.net.vn/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/9rsdvkhju15id6c3mkn0fq4mnn/34860648694.pdf
    • http://countrysquirefoods.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b5954e5bd50---govazujebakimoku.pdf
    • https://spazmedia.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606cea4844d62---dagurilemagutugajudawid.pdf
    • http://mazurubezpieczenia.pl/zdjecia/fck/file/rizuravipovosejofazeje.pdf
    • http://ymmicro.com/files/files/lirifavodubosi.pdf
    • https://cor.org.ar/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/vd36dqar95p57t1pu96kub3i9m/vuvizakido.pdf
    • http://slp72.com/clients/7/7b/7b902bee17765b19ebdde6030f24742d/File/87537393696.pdf
    • http://stroisvias.ru/userfiles/file/47857945416.pdf
    • http://absolutelyneon.com/userfiles/file/xosanok.pdf
    • http://fw-simple.com/uploads/files/49883149434.pdf
    • http://tamker.hu/userfiles/file/74196356474.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/6naE_Nh8_CY/uplcv?utm_term=fortnite+mobile+not+compatible
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f15d.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF15D 16792 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0001096f.bin
fd07cf209a3f5656544761b72729254edb3172113e25643c36a37102f5115375
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1096F 17088 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00013632.bin
c6a6bc6132aab398ce4073719edfaa7f7b5a90ddd6f4e57b071cbf204f187d6d
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x13632 10484 bytes