RTF malware analysis — malicious · f88b3a4c1151e844

MALICIOUS

RTF

8.2 KB

MD5: b09a15ec3039b2dbf82071b94f0d6c6d SHA-1: db113888353fa2244c3c0e3cc835fa7921544bf2 SHA-256: f88b3a4c1151e84431fca680da8400ea6f1b801f01f919fd59b273bd02a535d3

120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The sample is an RTF document that leverages the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882) via OLE object embedding and an \objupdate directive. This technique is commonly used to achieve arbitrary code execution. The embedded OLE object data, when decoded, likely contains shellcode or a loader for a second-stage payload. Given the critical heuristic firings and the nature of the exploit, the primary intent is to compromise the victim's system.

Heuristics 3

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000ec2.bin` `dd8e8197ec12e4e1844fc035788e31f405563c9a1eb8c5775f39fb9d9b435312`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xEC2	1621 bytes

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