Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f865adf4b5445985…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

10.8 KB First seen: 2022-02-24
MD5: 657289d8ae04dadd13f446b97e7f23ae SHA-1: b75268f3acabd538a37c004830c6c5a9bd07af57 SHA-256: f865adf4b5445985e0814ce70cc9b32701f1640de72f0facd385e1a5c549bae2
121 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is an RTF document that contains embedded OLE object data and specifically targets the Equation Editor component. The presence of RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics indicates an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor to achieve code execution. The RTF_OBJDATA heuristic further confirms the embedding of OLE objects, which is a common delivery mechanism for such exploits. No specific malware family could be identified, but the attack pattern is consistent with exploiting a vulnerable application to download and execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000180c.bin
4d05afabd01a3a1d2119b28c19a47994e1d8052fa1854a0be704acff71f47908
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x180C 2277 bytes