Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f847bbe4f45c3dec…

MALICIOUS

PDF

72.5 KB Created: 2021-09-14 05:06:26 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 9b5ec40f0f7faa449d632aa5f31f981e SHA-1: b02d593b5e54670f81b8bf70a592c7f1cef170f4 SHA-256: f847bbe4f45c3dec2e837fade37a83578b119b81a78ee2e0165c2d081af635f5
156 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains a link farm pointing to numerous unknown PDF files hosted on compromised CMS upload directories. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely for phishing or distributing further malware. The presence of multiple unknown PDF links suggests a redirection chain to a malicious payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9956

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://melodylavernebettencourt.com/media/file/92091898834.pdf
    • https://vegas-shop.net/uploads/files/9674867052.pdf
    • http://besteva.com/upload/files/91484447716.pdf
    • http://montoaneli.com/ckfinder/files/fupazafivenuvovok.pdf
    • http://visualpaint.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613fd820b7002---tamidiroxew.pdf
    • http://subventionsbetrug.de/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/qvkc1n8998evihuld0mn35ls3v/86193593426.pdf
    • http://theheavent.com/userfiles/files/dubelesovosufoxupid.pdf
    • http://hairtransplantmangalore.com/uploaded_files/userfiles/files/57769797285.pdf
    • http://dongshengcable.com/images/upload/File/ferabojafilumari.pdf
    • http://daiichihr.com/uploads/news_file/dodiginavefimazezo.pdf
    • http://mylodge-naoshima.com/images/blog/file/lifovimusog.pdf
    • http://jogagongu.pl/userfiles/file/15355622752.pdf
    • https://karolinanowak.com/userfiles/file/4433992155.pdf
    • http://syarmarka.ru/userfiles/files/zaxopitexagovunelisixinu.pdf
    • http://hyunshin.net/userfiles/file/fababijivigowivamofage.pdf
    • http://ags-sib.ru/ckfinder/userfiles/files/23155174372.pdf
    • http://kasaitogo.com/uploads/files/bosafuwagisowutal.pdf
    • http://jockmurray.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613cca165d497---kozog.pdf
    • https://sausalito.com/wysiwygfiles/file/dogapizezimotal.pdf
    • http://hastensandbreakfast.nl/userfiles/file/tigujexage.pdf
    • http://lionsmarsala.it/userfiles/files/57597953257.pdf
    • http://paulgraphics.paulsfashion.in/files/bomilamirex.pdf
    • https://wcfkenzi.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/zenetonot.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/1xuhb7AK25c/uplcv?utm_term=how+to+know+if+phone+is+hacked
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000bd63.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xBD63 16792 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000d575.bin
e321948700335a442e110ce198083d8a5ce306a480665c9c15c46a522d7848ab
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD575 15304 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0000fc0e.bin
285029808946fed1fdffc9df0bae441321dce6f13888ddf2d4c491bfd985ab70
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFC0E 10740 bytes