Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f82442fbd2a8d5f9…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

473.5 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-09-12
MD5: c034b44f547d8621622e0fe2fbc9d218 SHA-1: d3f845181b4d4e3b3120e394ba9f15a7948ab7f3 SHA-256: f82442fbd2a8d5f9106185e1c87c9c8427752fa8b11ae79ce16f637350f12c59
134 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample is an OLE file that exploits CVE-2017-0199 via a URL moniker to download a remote payload from https://mub.me/qew6. It also contains an embedded PDF with suspicious static findings, suggesting a multi-stage attack. No VBA macros were found to be executable, but the primary exploit vector is clear.

Heuristics 6

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
    PDF has 1 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://mub.me/qew6

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
stream_003_off00005f60.bin
2998a126f4fa11ceb265371a5f7968ec18bc4692a32631a544232dc74040021f
decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x5F60 252488 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00000e00.pdf
24dcd84322b4efa7f373ae3c685c8ab99ec281e8fa2d3402b19da515ec47c27d
polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0xE00 481280 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00006400.pdf
d5a6f8cf55fe92d26a9cc798523cf13e75bdc2b2f614c6661c89ef312f90f8bb
polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6400 459264 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00029000.pdf
ae7c688bb49f62852cc2c532ad8934dc08aeac0c5cdba9d0da14ecd864d09600
polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x29000 316928 bytes