Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f807f749fc1254b5…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

66.7 KB Created: 2020-05-04 15:16:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000
MD5: 815aa9832bface10d75d65e9924304c9 SHA-1: 1831c6e74655617af5b0918aae14e73acbbc0003 SHA-256: f807f749fc1254b5a48c21f60884c303ffaa6eab0d57f75bc0862cdcb2933f34
260 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The OOXML document contains a VBA macro that is automatically executed via the AutoOpen function. This macro utilizes a Shell() call to download and execute a second-stage payload from an obfuscated URL. The presence of the AutoOpen macro and the Shell() call strongly indicate a malicious intent to compromise the user's system. The obfuscated nature of the shell command suggests an attempt to evade detection.

Heuristics 7

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • Obfuscated VBA Shell command with URL critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_SHELL_URL
    VBA macro invokes Shell with command text assembled through decoder or string-manipulation functions and includes a URL. This is a high-confidence downloader/dropper pattern, stronger than Shell or URL evidence on their own.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
a5d624ee52de4df1fe3bd85bd1ea2519ef2a33abe2f9e81252b55b5dbe011fea		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 13054 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
2278c6888c9e9f84d4605752026560f81cdd366f7d98e289428e310b9e901d73		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 2342912 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 684 long base64-like blob(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.

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