Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f7ff1e0ebda976d7…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

183.9 KB Created: 2022-05-22 18:36:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 15.0000 First seen: 2022-05-24
MD5: 05d244a5600ff200a3898fc34faee57e SHA-1: 8eb69fd77a7ce2f68be77ed0ec7dd499214aad90 SHA-256: f7ff1e0ebda976d70b4f94a5929b42d18c5918fae30cd2742f1024d982bd14ef
82 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic

The critical heuristic firing indicates that the OOXML document contains an embedded OLE object with a VBA macro. This macro is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload from the URL https://www.mediafire.com/file/6dde6r6wjoelqt6/14.htm/file. The presence of this embedded macro and the external download URL strongly suggests a malicious intent to deliver further malware.

Heuristics 3

  • Embedded Office object carries macros critical OFFICE_EMBEDDED_MACRO_OBJECT
    This document embeds a second Office file that itself contains a VBA macro project or an Excel 4.0 (XLM) macro sheet. Hiding a macro-bearing workbook or document inside another document — frequently under an obfuscated, non-standard part name — is a macro-smuggling technique that defeats scanners which only inspect the outer document's macro storage. No benign authoring workflow stages a hidden macro project this way.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://www.mediafire.com/file/6dde6r6wjoelqt6/14.htm/file
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
bca6543387b650664f8a737365c5615e3a38723742976151f63b3f03fd76d611
ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/~~!~!!!~!~~!!!!~!!!!3.~~!~!!!~!~~!!!! 14474 bytes