Ole2.Exploit.ZxxZDownloader-9944376-0 RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · f7ed5eec6d186949

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

35.6 KB Created: 2020-01-08 08:54:00 First seen: 2022-05-13

MD5: 5e5201514800509b2e75a3fcffad7405 SHA-1: 33f7efb563052da4d25405dd7f0366bb3bff5b26 SHA-256: f7ed5eec6d1869498f2fca8f989125326b2d8cee8dcacf3bc9315ae7566963db

242 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Ole2.Exploit.ZxxZDownloader-9944376-0 · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell

The file is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object that exploits the CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability in Microsoft Equation Editor. This exploit is known to download and execute a second-stage payload. The ClamAV detection name 'Ole2.Exploit.ZxxZDownloader-9944376-0' further supports this analysis.

Heuristics 7

Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED

RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
ClamAV: Ole2.Exploit.ZxxZDownloader-9944376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Ole2.Exploit.ZxxZDownloader-9944376-0
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://schemas.microsoft.c

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000118.bin` `b31bb18094be3c64035dae51be7d6278e886c617e85b767dda4ed140eedadf13`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x118	6386 bytes
`objdata_01_off000033c1.bin` `9940434a489f0679d622a3c3aafd6223c1c1a89dd7afb61a85fbd89c393a6b6b`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x33C1	6386 bytes

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