Win.Trojan.FiveA-1 — Office (OLE) malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f7e7405fd5eba745…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

19.5 KB Created: 1997-12-15 12:18:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Word for Windows 95 First seen: 2012-06-14
MD5: f52bed14f2e8e1803066fd8403fbbc28 SHA-1: 1156a7c7ae620466544cadcfa64c1259b0ce99bc SHA-256: f7e7405fd5eba7451c04b5987f11d79063b7ea4eb48faf12ae057b3ced54d36b
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Win.Trojan.FiveA-1 · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The file is identified as malicious by ClamAV with the signature Win.Trojan.FiveA-1. Static analysis revealed a legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker (AutoClose), indicating an attempt to execute code upon opening. The embedded OLE object also shows suspicious findings, suggesting it may contain a secondary payload or exploit.

Heuristics 4

  • ClamAV: Win.Trojan.FiveA-1 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Trojan.FiveA-1
  • Embedded Office document has suspicious static findings critical EMBEDDED_OFFICE_CHILD_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A CFB/OLE Office document was found inside another file type and its carved contents matched Office exploit or payload heuristics. This catches wrapped exploit documents where the top-level file routes to a PE, archive, or generic scanner instead of Office.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • CFB header with no readable streams medium OLE_PARSE_EMPTY_STREAMS
    The file begins with a valid OLE2/CFB header but exposes no directory streams. A non-empty compound document with an unreadable directory is anomalous — it is seen with truncated/corrupt files and, more importantly, with content deliberately shifted off byte boundaries to defeat parsers while the host application still recovers the object.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_office_off00002100.ole embedded-office Embedded OLE/CFB Office body inside ole container at offset 0x2100 11520 bytes
SHA-256: b0d044b5eea01d01f6620d5c07a59b5edc1ce6f06f494481838c012816fd17a4