Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f7e2336811668c93…

MALICIOUS

RTF

11.5 KB
MD5: 2fcf1e23188eeb3d447e0e5b679d4f81 SHA-1: 9b3b2d9b72bf4efa4bec82b5ab7b30c62fd586a7 SHA-256: f7e2336811668c9340e3c7f11a3b9ef5fb8572ac5ea70dddffb1977601aa2402
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is an RTF document that contains OLE object data and specifically targets the Equation Editor vulnerability. The ".objupdate" directive indicates that the embedded OLE object will be activated automatically upon opening the document. This is a common technique for exploiting Equation Editor vulnerabilities to download and execute a second-stage payload. No scripts were extracted, and the document body was truncated, limiting further analysis of the specific lure.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000016e3.bin
bf7ad58fa349ef27fd2fb5ecc7a75190db887d26bf8eac5bdf183801004d92a5
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x16E3 2086 bytes