RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · f7e168a50adee618

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.65 MB

MD5: 8092f0fa7458b0e1d3094bc18cb2d726 SHA-1: 952722f286d32fc1d431905b70cc9b01b28e113b SHA-256: f7e168a50adee618d52c26f7710954629a5a6746c1ab8b89b98fd31a37e9110b

202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document that leverages the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882) to execute arbitrary code. The critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR heuristic confirms the presence of a decoded Equation Editor payload, which is likely responsible for downloading and executing a second-stage payload. The large amount of hex-encoded data within the OLE object further suggests the presence of a hidden payload.

Heuristics 6

Decoded Equation Editor payload + PE critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF decodes to an Equation Editor ProgID adjacent to OLE activation and the same decoded object stream contains embedded PE bytes. This matches the Equation Editor exploit surface used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 documents, while requiring payload evidence to avoid flagging benign Equation references.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX

RTF contains ~1722KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00001ad0.bin` `58695d4c77b0f467ceab530f4709e3082c99de5c53a7df8f7eef6d23ce630836`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1AD0	861340 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact entropy is 7.99, consistent with packed or encrypted content.

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