Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f7bfea2fc72a4fb8…

MALICIOUS

PDF

39.7 KB Created: 2020-08-20 08:07:08 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: ac3d8884893562f1bf8f351419291006 SHA-1: 810c13a0c7f961fa308a82ccac3341950adf34d8 SHA-256: f7bfea2fc72a4fb85caf49aa915c43287ed195a1489c5c6d18e9bcd31eb9bf4c
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell

The PDF contains a link to a known malicious redirector, ttraff.com, which is likely used to obscure the final destination. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains references to 'email contact form html php' and the malicious URL itself, suggesting a phishing lure. Additionally, the 'SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE' heuristic indicates the document may instruct the user to execute commands, potentially to download and run further payloads.

Heuristics 4

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/pify?keyword=email+contact+form+html+php
    • http://files.capccpnpalberta.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131407164/lusoni_wadabut.pdf
    • http://files.westashdesigns.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398479/mawavoban-bugowawax-lepireserov.pdf
    • http://files.aboundinlove.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131069869/nipumifabolej_wibuvupekefile.pdf
    • http://files.thepaintedacresranch.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131607010/d83e813dc769eb0.pdf
    • http://files.unioncongregationalucc.org/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775413/197179.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/51730359377.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/8568/5153/files/jozote.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/8280/8472/files/avenant_au_bail_gratuit.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0448/4608/8349/files/data_entry_test.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0438/4676/2656/files/90203843361.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/2503/1590/files/case_study_format_download.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/2466/2173/files/ctet_eligibility_2020.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/8286/6072/files/28796218424.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0438/8395/4328/files/bumazizosupel.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005d9c.bin
5443e88a8cf2e2fdd8bf3bea1d782252d1bfa4d5a11188730f3f4cba043f3ee2
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5D9C 5036 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00006e88.bin
e52d8962baaf877753f1dc6a9c064724300f82c0f5686acc46d741eb0711a5dc
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6E88 10448 bytes