Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f784e09f0f0279b2…

MALICIOUS

PDF

40.3 KB Created: 2020-11-09 09:14:45 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-15
MD5: 8fee2c82cab729b99176ff48d7b0beee SHA-1: 9b196e4fea52922d96719734a6dc05609af69493 SHA-256: f784e09f0f0279b261b21399ad29e14cfc425d1c200b20aa07edad3674bd5923
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains numerous embedded links, many of which point to a link farm hosted on disposable domains, with at least one link directing to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and embedded links suggest an attempt to redirect users to malicious sites, potentially for phishing or malware distribution.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/123?keyword=europe+travel+guide+books+free+pdf In PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4377112/normal_5f9657644fd8b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wosezobar.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856012/wevuri-naleduno-nijiniso.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://latowinu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134508675/guvepub.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zukolipiniroti.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134494738/dewotulomomise.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dofazodasi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130873943/4836338.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://vadazigifexe.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/merozasopegujibe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dekajerige.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/jiwanelasadewamexijukana.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vubugovomage.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/gomelenefanujalimo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fefitaw.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/64939725781.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/1a3baa9f-6501-41d3-abe2-d72652d93949/botabevibekujizuwinawiga.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fafutuk.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/68888585382.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kebupud.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/16674380217.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000050e0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x50E0 5204 bytes
SHA-256: edd6314e5721eebc6739d06fea6682f0eaaca8e4345efd91fa5efd2028dd852b
font_01_sfnt_off000062b1.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x62B1 10668 bytes
SHA-256: 1df039f9a4adc15f458216d0a8fb7412a9da93d96625a8a9c4e10194d7d57a28
font_02_sfnt_off0000864c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x864C 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 4fcfa7c68d76e23b667942a3ac892d2d5d88346478daafc61479ad4df4af3dd3