Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f7821032aac521b2…

MALICIOUS

RTF

1.7 KB Authoring application: Slimh20 6.186.5500 First seen: 2022-07-25
MD5: 875a296b6c96f54a5763b731f28895e1 SHA-1: bb29c388b221e1e5fcc795c00e6e1b57ef94aa40 SHA-256: f7821032aac521b29be502ff0bbd9f16b757a7bb59bf9b98301ee7494c9f7b26
260 Risk Score

Heuristics 7

  • Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object high CVE related RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF references Equation.3 ProgID alongside \objdata — likely Equation Editor (CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798) but without the binary CLSID payload, so flagged at HIGH instead of CRITICAL.
  • ClamAV: Rtf.Exploit.CVE_2018_0802-6624871-1 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Rtf.Exploit.CVE_2018_0802-6624871-1
  • Equation Editor object class critical RTF_OBJCLASS_EQUATION
    Object class 'equation.3' references Equation Editor
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000387.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x387 44 bytes
SHA-256: 4c0ba133ce842de3c981e37f8a2075965e13784edbc3a172001ca5aa734aec0b

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.