Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f74d73d282a70ccb…

MALICIOUS

PDF

95.2 KB Created: 2020-04-11 03:15:51 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.1.4 (via Qt 4.8.6)
MD5: 25424ee40754a730d2a8fab08b969287 SHA-1: eb00e3306bec653cd517643d283739290c778592 SHA-256: f74d73d282a70ccb04c355b2c9e9fe8fc0c77188f3a7e97bd3777e2e76eb432e
96 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF file contains a large number of external links to various domains, indicating a link farm or redirection scheme. The ML classifier flagged this PDF with high confidence. The primary attack pattern involves directing users to a network of potentially malicious PDF files hosted on these domains.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9836

Heuristics 4

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://pameladirnberger.com/uploads/1/3/0/2/130272586/130272586.html#watchmen+alan+moore
    • http://theworldofdvnny.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131384018/36cc167314d2e.pdf
    • http://energy-frequencies.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775704/wobozapibi_zegibava.pdf
    • http://garagedoorrepair-rancho-cucamonga-ca.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131406564/rafizeku.pdf
    • http://edgcumbe.org/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738755/4676857.pdf
    • http://atlasaprons.com/uploads/1/3/0/2/130270832/e8d2a5888.pdf
    • http://campsierrastars.com/uploads/1/3/0/5/130543462/zatewidozof.pdf
    • http://gnn-tv.com/uploads/1/3/0/4/130489776/nerupazazuja.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0001341c.bin
3d68318bf6d0765a35b08d54efeb7ff45a9b17a4726dacda57b46fdbcb6b9535		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1341C 9040 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0001565a.bin
2c4c30add83ef36b23b0731210519225d1a5d3c4b30736004158310665b42e43		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1565A 9540 bytes

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