Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f6e48788780d7937…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

28.5 KB First seen: 2022-11-14
MD5: 61c9c1a7b846a1ae0390796a8bac6fc7 SHA-1: 3aec25fdfcef1b63f6605d91ff22fadea3d15067 SHA-256: f6e48788780d79379d6b2d83106168e1f867fcb6d2b74a77fd7f67eff67ecc63
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a specific Equation Editor ProgID, triggered by \objupdate, indicating an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability. The document body includes a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing' to view or edit the document, which is a common technique for malware droppers to bypass security settings.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00005aa8.bin
54340cec5fff2b5a1acbfb5e023f6c8a1c12e95e23a6e269b1820f9d289a977c
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x5AA8 1693 bytes