Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Heuristics 10

• Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
  Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
• ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
  ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
• ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
  ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
• Embedded script payload in PDF stream high PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
  PDF stream bytes contain script execution markers such as ActiveXObject/CreateObject, WScript.Shell, PowerShell, or shell-exec primitives. This is stronger than ordinary PDF JavaScript because it indicates a staged external script payload hidden in stream bytes.
• LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
  Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
• Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
  Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
• Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
  One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
• External URI info PDF_URI
  PDF contains an external URL action
• Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
  The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
• Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
  One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
  URL https://gimoguvi.ru/aws?utm_term=why+did+montresor+want+to+kill+fortunato

  • https://xowunaxevome.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134679103/sijawiludoxoruj.pdf
  • https://vefonero.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070196/1451772.pdf
  • https://piziwola.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131382430/gisebapowu.pdf
  • https://suzixibaru.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134709676/5103433.pdf
  • https://giduwuxudi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134716719/fedigoxonozaw.pdf
  • https://cdn.sqhk.co/suwajipufo/ghewRLs/zozexiwenobikuvojowuvo.pdf
  • http://tijukavuwoka.iblogger.org/creed_2_theme_songs.pdf
  • https://kazawiluk.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135384823/5576133.pdf
  • https://cdn.sqhk.co/gutemokerezo/idFKtge/72617712314.pdf
  • https://cdn.sqhk.co/dasekizob/hjiiehc/car_seat_guidelines_uk.pdf
  • https://zadilomevesijob.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134581884/fesodeburot.pdf
  • https://rigawegafo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134587157/wowevefodijab_girewajofob_jatizijoz_digidamin.pdf
  • https://juxipibofo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/9/135985723/sefubiperigag.pdf
  • https://wixurawitubeza.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134319602/zolixajazaj-bevovuli.pdf
  • https://kesazawen.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134401730/ab1d83.pdf
  • https://cdn.sqhk.co/wanaxowuwot/jbPji87/trucks_off_road_game_setup.pdf
  • https://kazawiluk.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/
  • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
  • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
  • http://dakiwadizadenig.rf.gd/38812433693.pdf
  • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/b0fae145-123d-4803-b5b9-bd09d01f9906/manual_trena_bosch_glm_40.pdf
  • http://xuxuparozit.epizy.com/edmentum_plato_answer_key.pdf
  • http://lafanibawonol.rf.gd/smtp_auth_clients_report_powershell.pdf
  • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/282595fe-7b78-483e-942f-21014ee1fd43/attack_on_titan_part_2_end_of_the_world_full_movie_online.pdf
  • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/4819cde2-5c16-4601-ba5b-947eb957d188/39075678002.pdf
  • http://bepinodobax.rf.gd/simple_op_amp_circuits.pdf
  • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
  • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
  • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
  • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

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