Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f6cc06ebac160d99…

MALICIOUS

PDF

43.6 KB Created: 2020-08-24 00:27:20 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 7cdf33d07fdfa990c840c85c71b29d76 SHA-1: 4fccb1f8948daa8cd5ea6063cd84825a4be92461 SHA-256: f6cc06ebac160d9940244e836c05e60f827724b2593b39ee7be72e6a901bb020
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF file contains a significant number of embedded links, with a critical heuristic identifying a link to a known malicious redirector. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains the URL that triggered the redirector heuristic. This indicates a likely attempt to lure users to malicious sites. The presence of a link farm suggests a broad distribution or phishing campaign.

Heuristics 3

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/pify?keyword=medium+density+fibreboard+sheets
    • http://files.alicemcoleman.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776162/4726009.pdf
    • http://maravifo.sassyarabia.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874426/2567911.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/8770/8825/files/naverojigodosaxunigo.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0436/1030/8765/files/doctrine_many_to_many.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0436/9914/2810/files/bepolivik.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/1085/0979/files/attestation_d_lection_de_domicile.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/2070/6204/files/95284729303.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0438/2733/1232/files/bamedovoxivuxomufezov.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/2732/5343/files/gemoposiwarugejitak.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006c1b.bin
addc8dcde2bbf6e6c497984cfdc4feab3872379fe61c5786599605ed5bb30504		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6C1B 5360 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00007e31.bin
5c42c08936380ed23791d413a239937b5a625518483c369c99bea7491a675fd2		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7E31 10528 bytes

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