Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f6b772b7daf4c6f7…

MALICIOUS

PDF

41.6 KB Created: 2020-09-01 01:37:17 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 955c7201fefb5e043d98455d1df74b82 SHA-1: be42dc78ce257a1e8eab23377889a8787042a21b SHA-256: f6b772b7daf4c6f7f48d941cd7e0e549751a454faffa6174b3f0af80a79014b8
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF file contains a large number of embedded links, a technique often used in SEO poisoning or link farm attacks to obscure malicious destinations. One of the primary links directs to a known malicious redirector, ttraff.ru, which is disguised with a keyword related to 'Kindle previewer'. This suggests a social engineering attempt to trick users into clicking the link. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains the malicious URL and references to 'wkhtmltopdf', indicating it was likely generated programmatically.

Heuristics 3

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/wix?keyword=kindle+previewer+for+pc+free
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/c63dba_ca9948d184004be38633289fd81fc353.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_396b74fddcfa4f3ea21613a5cf13104d.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/451461_047db4cb99be43078db7f42adbbc9857.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/f515ca_1641475541c846a496bb9234172021e6.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_e28f30ce82144481a06ca84e8cbf376e.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/87d215_8e8e6c1e7f9e4b6aada89f2e596667ed.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/cfbfd2_7c36276be297401aa95caf607a5a13d7.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/a4e402_b3344c4b3ab2454a9bfbb0d074826ed1.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0451/1550/6853/files/action_bar_text_align_center_android.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/4551/9513/files/bugupepanezuro.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/3248/5799/files/refrigerator_see_through_door.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/6180/4198/files/58227132845.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_3849cf880a9d411e869eb4303ccdca74.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/a2d007_aac5731e6b43421cad9f35273241b67b.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/ce14f3_45d3d81dea934db7b91b52e55a6dc56b.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006634.bin
49df937e8cccfd24841d7d082a63631a6513cf62a4226d4d3fce4ea83115be41		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6634 4884 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000076fe.bin
84293dd918e8595e75d37d6936a2d810e987d26a7797f74265eb73b273c0bbfb		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x76FE 10092 bytes

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