Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f6a5aa9f30367492…

MALICIOUS

PDF

144.1 KB Created: 2021-07-07 01:38:51 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: d8071c463fe49f6749877cc80e7bd4fe SHA-1: 4c536b8dae0d7f0d4a287c9151fd0f9bc9a7b4fa SHA-256: f6a5aa9f30367492f5813e49ac6ea107b43c5cb4f72820155d1692f411cec96d
204 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains embedded JavaScript and numerous links to external URLs, many of which point to compromised WordPress uploads or disposable hosting, indicating a phishing or malware distribution attempt. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent. The embedded JavaScript likely facilitates the redirection to these malicious sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9742

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.kissdocs.com.au/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c5b0e606476---98406353964.pdf
    • http://lideparts.com/userfiles/file/1620813558.pdf
    • http://amicalelaique-guyancourt.fr/ckfinder/userfiles/files/75457828880.pdf
    • http://principessavencanice.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a6fc88eec10---kinunojasuvapufozum.pdf
    • http://c2mag.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160de68fabdd04---tisefuzag.pdf
    • http://drwatsonsr.com/clients/2/2b/2b9a0cf27321ceab3a47fbd10bf94d34/File/wufixamosujijedip.pdf
    • http://gmicropilotes.com/uploads/files/suvisu.pdf
    • http://cnmrobotics.com/files/files/6324446699.pdf
    • http://perlawarmii.pl/userfiles/file/luwazimisixofowev.pdf
    • http://msci.com.ng/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160853b38a3056---xaguvumubufasodepagumemaw.pdf
    • https://izharfoster.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609d180c52b4a---gudebukajarefuwel.pdf
    • https://www.m2asolutions.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/386f386738f0656b92f3d3e25fcab0aa/mesixebepezer.pdf
    • http://porpora.biz/imagenes/imagenes_contenidos///31669478037.pdf
    • https://asiatravel.kg/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/a5d6c2ef81a5dfef49cbf6d76dbb88ab/78100014437.pdf
    • http://www.pointcookelectrician.com.au/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608cb0c77d85a---71926434942.pdf
    • https://mimpi1pusat.com/contents//files/17584684846.pdf
    • https://serpavenger.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/52422922980.pdf
    • https://eyestech.in/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/trnaijuhkmb6kmpobb7caro1on/54709572485.pdf
    • https://www.karenlovelee.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16076e145c1038---12523136008.pdf
    • http://totaldeliverancecathedralchurch.com/clients/2/22/22dae496a1749ae881e6bee195142b05/File/64291453260.pdf
    • http://bamt.be/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607c739e51062---28488057388.pdf
    • https://otelnamore.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/e728a240c394e360e4c2869bdf95eec0/15878427240.pdf
    • https://www.tessilgiada.it/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160775cfe924e3---66509320467.pdf
    • http://renesens21.com/ressources/upload/files/54636092804.pdf
    • http://vhktn.at/images/content/files/vagegurifekanirobiwi.pdf
    • https://chinatupai.com/web/js/ckfinder/userfiles/files/82243578086.pdf
    • http://minutemen-jrotc.com/clients/84940/File/47640439879.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/S30rS-6n6vg/uplcv?utm_term=manual+receiver+sony
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0001d101.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1D101 16792 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0001e918.bin
6b299624b7baadc474d0a60987e0ec17611a5dfa0ec7be0bb68bf074a666bab1		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1E918 10396 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off000200c2.bin
9753f28c9144c1e0c93b3f69739fd7be94f9a4f89cd1e04f816d02db08ca1919		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x200C2 18732 bytes

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