Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f6908cd693299a89…

MALICIOUS

PDF

86.9 KB Created: 2021-07-21 12:31:45 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-24
MD5: 31b0bd6d3dd794e9d042a98b3cbb202f SHA-1: c2e510137e24836a93f761e83bc74d5de921a423 SHA-256: f6908cd693299a89beba9b420ff56ce72b81d7d6ca1e0d445f21f5a6a76f86ee
196 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The file is identified as malicious by ML classifiers and ClamAV, and exhibits characteristics of a social engineering lure. The heuristic 'SE_BROWSER_INSTALL_LURE' indicates the document likely prompts the user to install a browser extension or update, a common tactic for credential theft or malware delivery. While no scripts were directly extracted, the presence of numerous links to potentially compromised WordPress sites suggests an attempt to host malicious content or redirect users to malicious sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9992

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Browser extension / update installation lure high SE_BROWSER_INSTALL_LURE
    Document tells the user to install a browser extension, plugin, viewer, or browser update to view content — a common social-engineering path for credential theft and malware installation
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://beribuket.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/76fa13ed9c2517e8f8dcacac88877203/14234360187.pdf In PDF document text
    • https://www.andreivieru.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/86827224837.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ajwatravel.com/wheelmarine/userfiles/file/xudilaxasabobegaj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://extremetour74.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ae3edc7d4fb38a1d7374187b8169b3c1/48414654783.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sylvianapoles.com/clients/e/e6/e63d90d46a840f0b3195f531cec11f6e/File/noferifaliri.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lakecountyoralsurgery.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160af6f10e7bb6---93021406085.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.cdscabling.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607afa8372391---vopijijukujume.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jjmassociates.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/677073d4748190477c2846df20cace5e/jataberobutageveve.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://thetitangroup.ca/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/c1f52175c3116d6bb13ced93305b667b/wozulut.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.focus.mu/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/b8802dbba42408fffa82e4386ccb8795/84297307836.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.goataxiservice.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a18c17af366---64401207454.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gpagroup.in/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c3149e0885c---72264443020.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://countrysquirefoods.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609bcade44841---xizupemit.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://walker-doss.com/clients/4/45/450b4a4af5ff3f13851793278d9c7ef8/File/wifutudu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.infratechgroep.nl/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/55d2e2b73ac26b79778332d8728ee103/3091013368.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://itracmediav5.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/gakinidikob.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://topinsolventa.ro/userfiles/file/wutofunulogore.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://militarynetwork.ca/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609b838063c36---1443777226.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://marathon-gexin.com/Uploadfiles/files/2004210196.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.airportlimofortlauderdale.net/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608cc608a1109---47532206407.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/DOqCt-cVA4I/uplcv?utm_term=pubg+mobile+download+ucPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ee4d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEE4D 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off00010664.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10664 10676 bytes
SHA-256: e6db2e08eb819257f5d384f09aa3a92cf4eac33cc86a07c8567a3de969e2c913
font_02_sfnt_off00011e9f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11E9F 18692 bytes
SHA-256: 40346e23c631b7cc3f370748f641d4234273082d62473bdcb64c73d493c41b49

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