Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f687ff9c309b0258…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.6 KB
MD5: edca7456f9ee5761b3ef174e5e532f53 SHA-1: c0fe849c5076d68bbe74bda46d0084b58dbd9f0a SHA-256: f687ff9c309b0258483146f5325fdaf48d0cff6440c49932e671e45e56e8e3b2
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.002 Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of \objupdate indicates that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically, leading to the execution of malicious code. This is a common delivery mechanism for exploiting client-side vulnerabilities.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000aa.bin
f4ac068a7a1357c046ca83f0d2c102fa715cf8cbd32fd03787dc9bdcb2f17437
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xAA 1520 bytes