Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f6701ff55451c155…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

213.3 KB
MD5: 79785c72a389370b7b6c47991b37a49b SHA-1: dd72badbc1aeed28426e56e03c18dc8713a818fc SHA-256: f6701ff55451c155a3d8cb73646c2159ea9938cbea945b8302fb39754422c621
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 User Execution T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains multiple embedded OLE objects, with specific heuristics indicating that \objupdate forces OLE activation and that composite monikers are present. The document body explicitly instructs the user to 'click Enable Editing', a known lure to bypass macro security settings. This suggests the document is designed to exploit embedded objects upon user interaction, likely to download and execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • OlePres presentation stream in RTF OLE object medium RTF_OLEPRES_STREAM
    RTF contains an embedded OLE object with an OlePres presentation stream. OlePres is an OLE presentation marker and is not enough on its own to identify CVE-2025-21298.
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000bd0.bin
0f6dae29e44c610b6d165887071f27feb93cebb4ea684b80289079d2b2106eb7
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBD0 12898 bytes
objdata_01_off00007239.bin
0d5d09fb7e87d140659b8f662dc3a7b92cd848450a431d1974047996c57d1f01
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x7239 2632 bytes
objdata_02_off000087d4.bin
cfdf79b95584afe599f8bd01e391d8904839d9495e407a353433d3f5e3be3602
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x87D4 12261 bytes